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LiveCritical◐Partly contained

Over-permissioned Safe module abused to drain about $7.8M in rsETH; MEV bot front-runs the thief

A user's Safe multisig with a custom Uniswap v4 liquidity module

On 15 September 2026 an attacker abused a custom Uniswap v4 liquidity module and a Multicall helper that an Ethereum Safe multisig owner had approved, pointing the wallet's position at a malicious pool and unwrapping about 2,882 rsETH (around $7.8M). Blockaid described it as abuse of module permissions on that one Safe, not a bug in Safe itself or a stolen owner key. MEV bot Yoink front-ran the attacker and took the funds, Kelp DAO froze that address within about two hours, and whether the funds come back is unresolved. Safe owners should audit every enabled module.

Why this severity: $7.8M reported stolen, 1 victims, only partly contained.

Started
Sep 15, 2026
Chains
Ethereum
Reported stolen
$7.8M
Victims
1

Follow this incident

At risk

  • A user's Safe multisig with a custom Uniswap v4 liquidity module
  • Ethereum wallets

What to do now

  • In the Safe app, open Settings, then Modules, and remove any module you don't use or can't explain.
  • For modules you keep, ask the provider for an audit and confirm exactly who can call them and with what data.

Stay safe

Am I affected?

If your Safe has modules enabled (automation, liquidity managers, Multicall-style helpers), each one can move funds without the usual owner signatures. A flaw in any of them puts the whole Safe at risk.

What to do now

  • In the Safe app, open Settings, then Modules, and remove any module you don't use or can't explain.
  • For modules you keep, ask the provider for an audit and confirm exactly who can call them and with what data.

How to avoid this

  • Treat enabling a module like handing over a key. Only enable audited modules from teams you trust, and avoid ones that pass through arbitrary call data or use DELEGATECALL.
  • Keep large balances in a Safe with no modules, and use a separate Safe for automated strategies.

Timeline 2

  1. MEV bot Yoink front-ran the exploit by paying the block builder about $46,000, and Kelp DAO froze the receiving address within about two hours.

    Source
  2. At 04:38 UTC the attacker used the approved module to unwrap the Safe's aEthrsETH into about 2,882 rsETH; Blockaid flagged the theft.

    Source
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