{ "site": "https://drains.watch", "generatedAt": "2026-10-22T21:54:42.802Z", "updatedAt": "2026-10-22T21:53:35.016Z", "live": 24, "incidents": [ { "slug": "eip-7702-delegation-drain-22k-oct-2026", "title": "Dormant EIP-7702 authorization used weeks later to drain an Ethereum wallet", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/eip-7702-delegation-drain-22k-oct-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/eip-7702-delegation-drain-22k-oct-2026.json", "status": "live", "severity": "medium", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "ethereum" ], "method": "eip-7702-phishing", "product": "An Ethereum wallet holding TAPEETH mining rewards", "tags": [ "ethereum", "eip-7702-phishing", "eip-7702", "type-4-transaction", "sponsored-transaction", "exvul", "tapeeth" ], "amountUsd": 22770, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2026-10-14", "closedAt": null, "updatedAt": "2026-10-14T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 14 October 2026 an attacker used an EIP-7702 authorization the victim had signed earlier to drain 9.1231 ETH (about $22,770) and TAPEETH rewards from an Ethereum wallet, ExVul reported. The attacker sponsored a type-4 transaction carrying the old signature, which made the victim's wallet run attacker code that claimed mining rewards and withdrew the ETH in one go. ExVul said the malicious delegation was still active afterwards and that TAPEETH and PodMining were not at fault. The case shows a 7702 signature can sit unused and be fired later." }, { "slug": "coldcard-x-account-phishing-post-oct-2026", "title": "COLDCARD's X account posts fake 'security migration' phishing link", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/coldcard-x-account-phishing-post-oct-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/coldcard-x-account-phishing-post-oct-2026.json", "status": "live", "severity": "medium", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "bitcoin" ], "method": "social-engineering", "product": "COLDCARD hardware wallet users on X", "tags": [ "bitcoin", "social-engineering", "x-account-hack", "coldcard", "hardware-wallet", "seed-phrase-phishing", "fake-security-alert", "fake-firmware", "phishing" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-10-11", "closedAt": "2026-10-11", "updatedAt": "2026-10-11T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 11 October 2026 the official X account of hardware wallet maker COLDCARD published an unauthorized post claiming a flaw in recovery phrase generation in newer firmware and urging users to move their Bitcoin through a 'security migration' site that impersonated COLDCARD. The company deleted the post, said it was investigating how it was published, and said it found no matching login or session record despite offline 2FA. No losses were confirmed. The only official site is coldcard.com; never enter a seed phrase on any website." }, { "slug": "noir-drainer-dns-txt-c2-oct-2026", "title": "Noir wallet drainer kit hides its backend behind DNS TXT records and DoH", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/noir-drainer-dns-txt-c2-oct-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/noir-drainer-dns-txt-c2-oct-2026.json", "status": "live", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "ai-malware", "note": "Infoblox says it seems likely the Noir drainer kit is created and maintained with AI assistance, based on its verbose explanatory code comments, while noting a human could also have written it." }, "chains": [ "multi-evm" ], "method": "drainer-kit", "product": "Users of Uniswap, Lido, Hyperliquid, Polymarket and other brands targeted by Noir lure pages", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "drainer-kit", "drainer-as-a-service", "noir-drainer", "dns-txt", "doh", "cloudflare-pages", "netlify", "walletconnect", "fake-airdrop", "infoblox", "ai" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-10-09", "closedAt": null, "updatedAt": "2026-10-22T21:53:35.016Z", "summary": "Infoblox Threat Intel described Noir on 9 October 2026, a wallet-drainer kit that looks up its backend pool through DNS TXT records over public DNS-over-HTTPS, so operators can repoint every lure page by changing one record. Lures impersonate CoinMarketCap, DexScreener, OKX, Uniswap, Lido, Hyperliquid, Morpho, Ondo, LayerZero, MegaETH, Polymarket and others with fake votes, airdrop checks and swap clones. It steals by getting token spending permissions, then cuts the WalletConnect session to hide the trail. Infoblox gave no loss figures and says the kit was likely AI-developed." }, { "slug": "ledger-cryptobilis-tampered-hardware-wallets", "title": "Tampered Ledger wallets from an Asian reseller leak seed phrases; on-chain estimate puts losses near $102M", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/ledger-cryptobilis-tampered-hardware-wallets", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/ledger-cryptobilis-tampered-hardware-wallets.json", "status": "live", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "partly-contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "tron", "ethereum", "bsc", "polygon", "solana", "bitcoin" ], "method": "supply-chain", "product": "Ledger hardware wallets (Nano X, Flex, Stax) bought from reseller CryptoBilis and some other third-party sellers", "tags": [ "tron", "ethereum", "bsc", "polygon", "solana", "bitcoin", "supply-chain", "ledger", "hardware-wallet", "cryptobilis", "reseller", "hardware-implant", "seed-phrase-theft", "tether-freeze" ], "amountUsd": 102000000, "victims": 324, "startedAt": "2026-10-09", "closedAt": null, "updatedAt": "2026-10-16T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Ledger hardware wallets sold by CryptoBilis, a Southeast Asian reseller, had a hidden implant added after manufacture that read the 24-word recovery phrase during setup and sent it out over an LTE eSIM. Coordinated drains began on 9 October 2026 across TRON, Ethereum, BNB Chain, Polygon, Solana and Bitcoin. Bitquery's on-chain estimate is about $102M from 324 wallets, and investigator Specter put it above $86M. Ledger has not confirmed a figure. Anyone who set up a Ledger bought from a third-party seller in the affected markets should move funds to a new seed made on a device bought direct." }, { "slug": "fomo-bookmarklet-fake-verification-oct-2026", "title": "Fake 'human verification' bookmarklet hijacks Fomo account, drains about $48K from embedded wallet", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/fomo-bookmarklet-fake-verification-oct-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/fomo-bookmarklet-fake-verification-oct-2026.json", "status": "live", "severity": "medium", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "solana" ], "method": "bookmarklet", "product": "Fomo web app users (Privy embedded wallets)", "tags": [ "solana", "bookmarklet", "fomo", "privy", "embedded-wallet", "session-hijack", "fake-captcha", "fake-verification", "token-page-link", "slowmist", "privacy-cash" ], "amountUsd": 48000, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2026-10-08", "closedAt": null, "updatedAt": "2026-10-08T12:00:00Z", "summary": "A Fomo user clicked a project website link on a token page and landed on a phishing site that asked them to drag an icon to the bookmarks bar and click it three times as a 'human verification'. The bookmark ran on the logged-in Fomo page and took the Privy login tokens and wallet data from browser storage, and about $48,000 (mostly USDC) was moved out. The victim never connected a wallet, signed anything or typed a seed phrase, and had no two-factor login enabled. Fomo users who ran any such bookmark should revoke sessions from a trusted device, turn on MFA and move funds." }, { "slug": "firefox-fake-rabby-okx-wallet-extensions-oct-2026", "title": "16 fake Rabby and OKX Wallet add-ons on Firefox stole recovery phrases and private keys", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/firefox-fake-rabby-okx-wallet-extensions-oct-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/firefox-fake-rabby-okx-wallet-extensions-oct-2026.json", "status": "live", "severity": "medium", "threatStatus": "partly-contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "multi-evm" ], "method": "malicious-extension", "product": "Firefox users who installed fake Rabby Wallet or OKX Wallet add-ons", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "malicious-extension", "firefox", "browser-extension", "fake-wallet", "rabby", "okx-wallet", "seed-phrase-theft", "socket" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-10-05", "closedAt": null, "updatedAt": "2026-10-07T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Socket found 16 Firefox extensions posing as Rabby Wallet (branded 'Raabby WaIIet') and OKX Wallet ('Portal WALLET'). They captured 12- or 24-word recovery phrases and private keys during the wallet import step and sent them to attacker-run Cloudflare Workers. Mozilla removed them by 5 October 2026, but Socket links them to a crypto-theft extension campaign it first saw in August 2026, so new copies may appear. No loss figure has been published; anyone who imported a seed into one of them should treat that wallet as stolen." }, { "slug": "address-poisoning-305k-dai-oct-2026", "title": "User loses about $305K in DAI after copying a poisoned lookalike address from history", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/address-poisoning-305k-dai-oct-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/address-poisoning-305k-dai-oct-2026.json", "status": "live", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "multi-evm" ], "method": "address-poisoning", "product": "A DAI holder sending to a regular counterparty", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "address-poisoning", "dust-attack", "lookalike-address", "dai", "stablecoin", "goplus" ], "amountUsd": 305000, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2026-10-04", "closedAt": null, "updatedAt": "2026-10-05T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 4 October 2026 GoPlus Security flagged a loss of about $305,000 in DAI. The attacker made an address with the same first and last characters as the victim's usual recipient, sent dust transfers so it appeared in the victim's history, and the victim copied it for a large transfer. GoPlus warned these campaigns are now fully automated, from finding targets to laundering. Reports did not name the chain." }, { "slug": "permit2-phishing-link-167k-oct-2026", "title": "Old Permit2 phishing approval used to drain $167K in LINK", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/permit2-phishing-link-167k-oct-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/permit2-phishing-link-167k-oct-2026.json", "status": "live", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "ethereum" ], "method": "permit-phishing", "product": "An Ethereum LINK holder", "tags": [ "ethereum", "permit-phishing", "permit2", "signature-phishing", "dormant-approval", "link", "scam-sniffer" ], "amountUsd": 167342, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2026-10-03", "closedAt": null, "updatedAt": "2026-10-04T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Scam Sniffer flagged a user who lost $167,342 in LINK on Ethereum when an attacker used a phishing approval targeting Permit2 to move the tokens on 3 October 2026. The victim had signed the approval long before (Incrypted dates it to 18 August 2025), which shows a malicious approval can sit unused for weeks or months before the drain. Anyone who has signed unfamiliar approvals should review and revoke them now." }, { "slug": "bitget-hot-wallet-breach-zero-day-sep-2026", "title": "Bitget hot and warm wallets drained of $387.5M after zero-day in third-party security appliances", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/bitget-hot-wallet-breach-zero-day-sep-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/bitget-hot-wallet-breach-zero-day-sep-2026.json", "status": "live", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "ethereum", "arbitrum", "avalanche", "optimism", "bsc", "base" ], "method": null, "product": "Bitget exchange hot and warm wallets", "tags": [ "ethereum", "arbitrum", "avalanche", "optimism", "bsc", "base", "exchange", "bitget", "hot-wallet", "zero-day", "infrastructure-breach", "dprk" ], "amountUsd": 387500000, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-09-24", "closedAt": "2026-09-28", "updatedAt": "2026-10-15T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Attackers exploited a zero-day in two third-party security appliances at exchange Bitget, moved on to its production wallet job server and used a custom withdrawal tool to drain hot and warm wallets on 24-25 September 2026. The confirmed loss is about $387.5 million (first reported as $351.6M) across Ethereum, Arbitrum, Avalanche, Optimism, BSC, Base and the XRP Ledger. Bitget's CEO blamed North Korean hackers, and Bitget said cold wallets and private keys were not compromised. Hacken's Q3 figures say about $387M was covered by Bitget's user protection fund." }, { "slug": "duelbits-hot-wallet-drain-sep-2026", "title": "Crypto casino Duelbits loses about $7M from hot wallets in suspected private-key compromise", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/duelbits-hot-wallet-drain-sep-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/duelbits-hot-wallet-drain-sep-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "ethereum", "bsc", "tron", "bitcoin", "solana" ], "method": "key-leak", "product": "Duelbits crypto casino hot wallets", "tags": [ "ethereum", "bsc", "tron", "bitcoin", "solana", "key-leak", "casino", "gambling", "hot-wallet", "private-key-compromise", "duelbits" ], "amountUsd": 7000000, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-09-24", "closedAt": "2026-09-27", "updatedAt": "2026-10-06T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 24 September 2026 crypto casino Duelbits had hot wallets drained across Ethereum, BNB Chain, Tron, Bitcoin and Solana. Co-founder Joe called it a hack of about $7M; other estimates run from about $4.2M (Scam Sniffer, early) to about $6M (CertiK), and Rekt traced about $6.07M. Scam Sniffer and SlowMist point to a leaked private key, but Duelbits has not published a root cause. The site reopened on 27 September and said user funds were safe." }, { "slug": "singularitynet-bridge-signing-key-compromise-sep-2026", "title": "SingularityNET bridge keys abused after cloud breach: 8.72M FET released, billions of tokens minted", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/singularitynet-bridge-signing-key-compromise-sep-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/singularitynet-bridge-signing-key-compromise-sep-2026.json", "status": "live", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "partly-contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "ethereum", "bsc" ], "method": "key-leak", "product": "SingularityNET / ASI Alliance bridge and conversion contracts (also NuNet, Cogito, Rejuve and World Mobile tokens)", "tags": [ "ethereum", "bsc", "key-leak", "bridge", "cloud-compromise", "signing-key", "unauthorized-mint", "singularitynet", "asi-alliance", "nunet", "fet", "agix" ], "amountUsd": 2290000, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-09-19", "closedAt": null, "updatedAt": "2026-09-25T12:00:00Z", "summary": "An unauthorized party got into part of SingularityNET's cloud infrastructure and on 19-20 September 2026 used a compromised authorizer signature and NuNet's mint authority to release 8.72M FET from a bridge and mint about 2.3 billion AGIX, NTX, WMTX and CGV. Sixteen wallets, four labelled as SingularityNET or NuNet staff, were swept before the minting. Headlines cited $16.77M, but Rekt's transaction-level count found about $2.29M in sellable proceeds because most minted tokens could not be sold. Bridges and converters are offline and AGIX is being replaced, so holders should wait for official migration steps." }, { "slug": "waterplum-contagious-interview-advisory-sep-2026", "title": "Joint advisory: North Korea's WaterPlum fake-job campaign infected 30,000 devices, hit 7,000+ wallets", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/waterplum-contagious-interview-advisory-sep-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/waterplum-contagious-interview-advisory-sep-2026.json", "status": "live", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "ai-lure", "note": "The attackers reportedly use AI face-swapping software during online job interviews, then turn off their cameras and blame network problems." }, "chains": [ "multi-evm" ], "method": "social-engineering", "product": "Crypto, AI and NFT developers and job seekers", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "social-engineering", "dprk", "waterplum", "contagious-interview", "fake-job-interview", "npm", "vscode", "beavertail", "invisibleferret", "ottercookie", "stoatwaffle", "infostealer", "ai" ], "amountUsd": 10710000, "victims": 7000, "startedAt": "2026-09-18", "closedAt": null, "updatedAt": "2026-10-22T21:53:35.016Z", "summary": "On 18 September 2026 Japanese, US, Australian and German authorities warned that the North Korean group WaterPlum, linked to the 'Contagious Interview' campaign, infected at least 30,000 devices in more than 100 countries between December 2025 and July 2026. Posing as AI, crypto or NFT firms and recruiters, they get targets to run code during fake interviews and coding tests, including malicious npm packages and VS Code projects, then steal private keys, seed phrases and passwords. Funds or credentials were taken from over 7,000 wallets, and more than 1.7 billion yen (about $10.71M) went to North Korea. The advisory does not say the campaign has stopped." }, { "slug": "dcent-app-wallet-seed-compromise-sep-2026", "title": "D'CENT app-wallet users drained of over $18M as compromised seeds hit XRP, Ethereum, Bitcoin and Tron", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/dcent-app-wallet-seed-compromise-sep-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/dcent-app-wallet-seed-compromise-sep-2026.json", "status": "live", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "ethereum", "tron", "bitcoin" ], "method": "key-leak", "product": "D'CENT mobile App Wallet users (wallets created in the app)", "tags": [ "ethereum", "tron", "bitcoin", "key-leak", "dcent", "iotrust", "mobile-wallet", "seed-phrase", "xrp", "thorchain" ], "amountUsd": 18000000, "victims": 6678, "startedAt": "2026-09-15", "closedAt": null, "updatedAt": "2026-09-28T12:00:00Z", "summary": "From 15 to 20 September 2026 thieves emptied at least 6,678 wallets created in the D'CENT mobile app in six waves, taking about 11.7M XRP, and kept draining after 21 September for a total above 12.4M XRP (over $18M per Protos). D'CENT's own disclosure also named Bitcoin, Tron and Ethereum, and the stolen XRP was moved to Ethereum through THORChain. The cause is compromised recovery phrases for wallets made in the app; how they leaked has not been explained. D'CENT says app-created wallets are vulnerable and tells users to make a new recovery phrase and move everything." }, { "slug": "safe-module-authorization-abuse-rseth-sep-2026", "title": "Over-permissioned Safe module abused to drain about $7.8M in rsETH; MEV bot front-runs the thief", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/safe-module-authorization-abuse-rseth-sep-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/safe-module-authorization-abuse-rseth-sep-2026.json", "status": "live", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "partly-contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "ethereum" ], "method": null, "product": "A user's Safe multisig with a custom Uniswap v4 liquidity module", "tags": [ "ethereum", "safe", "multisig", "safe-module", "uniswap-v4", "multicall", "rseth", "kelp-dao", "mev", "blockaid" ], "amountUsd": 7800000, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2026-09-15", "closedAt": null, "updatedAt": "2026-09-15T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 15 September 2026 an attacker abused a custom Uniswap v4 liquidity module and a Multicall helper that an Ethereum Safe multisig owner had approved, pointing the wallet's position at a malicious pool and unwrapping about 2,882 rsETH (around $7.8M). Blockaid described it as abuse of module permissions on that one Safe, not a bug in Safe itself or a stolen owner key. MEV bot Yoink front-ran the attacker and took the funds, Kelp DAO froze that address within about two hours, and whether the funds come back is unresolved. Safe owners should audit every enabled module." }, { "slug": "brevo-flaw-trezor-bitbox-phishing-emails-sep-2026", "title": "Brevo login flaw lets attacker email a fake Trezor 'STM32 entropy' alert to 347,000 subscribers", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/brevo-flaw-trezor-bitbox-phishing-emails-sep-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/brevo-flaw-trezor-bitbox-phishing-emails-sep-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "medium", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "bitcoin", "multi-evm" ], "method": "social-engineering", "product": "Trezor, BitBox and CoinTracking newsletter subscribers", "tags": [ "bitcoin", "multi-evm", "social-engineering", "email-phishing", "seed-phishing", "hardware-wallet", "trezor", "bitbox", "cointracking", "brevo", "newsletter" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-09-09", "closedAt": "2026-09-11", "updatedAt": "2026-09-11T12:00:00Z", "summary": "An attacker abused an authorization flaw in email platform Brevo to reach 138 client accounts and send phishing from six of them. One was a fake Trezor 'Critical Security Alert: STM32 Entropy Vulnerability' sent to about 347,000 Trezor newsletter subscribers, linking to an app that asked for wallet backups; BitBox's list and CoinTracking (a fake 'refresh API keys' email) were also used. Trezor took the phishing domain down within 20 minutes; about 2,500 people opened the link and no losses have been reported. Recipients should expect follow-up phishing to the same addresses." }, { "slug": "gadgethumans-mcp-npm-sends-wallet-private-key-sep-2026", "title": "Knostic: 'gadgethumans-mcp' npm MCP server sends users' raw wallet private key to a remote server", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/gadgethumans-mcp-npm-sends-wallet-private-key-sep-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/gadgethumans-mcp-npm-sends-wallet-private-key-sep-2026.json", "status": "live", "severity": "medium", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "agent-target", "note": "The package is an MCP server for AI agents, and it sends the wallet key configured for agent auto-payments to a remote server on each tool call." }, "chains": [ "base" ], "method": "key-leak", "product": "gadgethumans-mcp (npm)", "tags": [ "base", "key-leak", "mcp", "mcp-server", "npm", "x402", "ai-agent", "agent-payments", "private-key", "ai" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-09-08", "closedAt": null, "updatedAt": "2026-09-08T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Knostic reported on 8 September 2026 that gadgethumans-mcp, an npm MCP server that promises AI agents automatic x402 micropayments, asks users to set a wallet private key but does no local signing. Instead it copies the raw key into a request header and sends it to a remote endpoint on every recognized tool call, which would let whoever receives it take over the wallet. The package had 2,327 downloads in July and August 2026 and was still on npm when the report came out; Knostic found no confirmed thefts. Anyone who set a key in it should move funds and use a fresh, low-balance wallet." }, { "slug": "chrome-edge-19-extensions-wallet-drainer-aug-2026", "title": "19 Chrome and Edge extensions hid a wallet drainer that hijacked Connect Wallet and Swap buttons", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/chrome-edge-19-extensions-wallet-drainer-aug-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/chrome-edge-19-extensions-wallet-drainer-aug-2026.json", "status": "live", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "partly-contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "multi-evm", "solana", "tron" ], "method": "malicious-extension", "product": "Users of 19 Chrome/Edge extensions incl. 'Enable Right Click & Copy', 'Multi-Chain Explorer' and 'LedgerLook: Wallet Checker'", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "solana", "tron", "malicious-extension", "chrome", "edge", "browser-extension", "extension-takeover", "seed-phishing", "clickfix", "ledger", "trezor", "metamask", "socket" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-08-30", "closedAt": null, "updatedAt": "2026-08-30T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Socket found 19 Chrome and Edge extensions, from crypto price trackers and explorers to general tools like 'Enable Right Click & Copy' (70,000+ Chrome users), that loaded a modular malware framework. It drained EVM, Solana and Tron wallets by hijacking 'Connect Wallet' and 'Swap' buttons, swapped Ledger and Trezor sites for seed-phishing pages and stole exchange sessions; five extensions were bought from their original developers and turned malicious through updates. Socket thinks the campaign may date back to early 2024. Google removed the Chrome listings, but when BleepingComputer reported it on 30 August 2026 the Edge version of one was still available." }, { "slug": "whale-wallet-25m-drain-aug-2026", "title": "Whale drained of $25.6M in aWBTC, DAI, WBTC and ETH; same wallet lost $24M to phishing in 2023", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/whale-wallet-25m-drain-aug-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/whale-wallet-25m-drain-aug-2026.json", "status": "live", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "ethereum" ], "method": null, "product": "Unidentified Ethereum whale wallet", "tags": [ "ethereum", "whale", "phishing", "aave", "awbtc", "peckshield", "repeat-victim" ], "amountUsd": 25600000, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2026-08-12", "closedAt": null, "updatedAt": "2026-08-13T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 12 August 2026 an unidentified whale lost about $25.6M, including about $6.3M in aWBTC, $5.1M in DAI, $4.7M in WBTC and $2.6M in ETH, according to PeckShield. Analyst Specter called it a phishing attack and PeckShield called it a hack; the exact method has not been published. The attacker swapped the funds into DAI and ETH across four addresses. The same wallet lost about $24.2M through malicious token approvals in September 2023." }, { "slug": "eip-7702-usenix-study-malicious-delegations-aug-2026", "title": "USENIX study: over 63% of EIP-7702 authorization transactions tied to malicious contracts", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/eip-7702-usenix-study-malicious-delegations-aug-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/eip-7702-usenix-study-malicious-delegations-aug-2026.json", "status": "live", "severity": "low", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "multi-evm" ], "method": "eip-7702-phishing", "product": "Users of EIP-7702 smart accounts on Ethereum and other EVM chains", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "eip-7702-phishing", "eip-7702", "research", "usenix", "sweeper", "smart-account", "advisory" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-08-01", "closedAt": null, "updatedAt": "2026-08-01T12:00:00Z", "summary": "A peer-reviewed study presented at USENIX Security '26 (August 2026) found 924 malicious contract accounts across seven chains that support EIP-7702, with more than $2.3 million in losses and over 10 million users exposed. The authors say over 63% of authorization transactions in their data were linked to attacks on regular wallets, and nearly half of the most-authorized contracts were attacker-controlled. The study window ends in mid-2025, so it measures early abuse, not today's rate. It confirms that 7702 delegation is a major phishing and key-theft sweep vector." }, { "slug": "triple-a-hot-wallets-drained-jul-2026", "title": "Crypto payments firm Triple-A loses $9.7M+ from hot wallets on Ethereum, Solana, TRON and TON", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/triple-a-hot-wallets-drained-jul-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/triple-a-hot-wallets-drained-jul-2026.json", "status": "live", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "partly-contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "solana", "ethereum", "tron" ], "method": null, "product": "Triple-A payment processor hot wallets", "tags": [ "solana", "ethereum", "tron", "payments", "hot-wallet", "treasury", "triple-a", "multi-chain", "peckshield" ], "amountUsd": 9700000, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-07-24", "closedAt": null, "updatedAt": "2026-07-25T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On Jul 24, 2026, on-chain analyst Specter flagged suspicious outflows from hot wallets of the crypto payment processor Triple-A, and PeckShield later estimated losses above $9.7 million. crypto.news lists Ethereum, Solana, TRON and TON as affected, with some reports adding Polygon and Arbitrum. The proceeds were gathered in an Ethereum address holding about 5,227 ETH. The cause had not been disclosed, and no evidence tied the breach to Triple-A's custody provider Fireblocks. Merchants and customers should rely only on Triple-A's official channels for updates." }, { "slug": "eip-7702-pancakeswap-lp-2-96m-jul-2026", "title": "Dormant PancakeSwap LP loses $2.96M after signing a malicious EIP-7702 authorization", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/eip-7702-pancakeswap-lp-2-96m-jul-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/eip-7702-pancakeswap-lp-2-96m-jul-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "bsc" ], "method": "eip-7702-phishing", "product": "A PancakeSwap liquidity provider (BNB Chain)", "tags": [ "bsc", "eip-7702-phishing", "eip-7702", "pancakeswap", "liquidity-provider", "tornado-cash", "specter" ], "amountUsd": 2960000, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2026-07-23", "closedAt": "2026-07-23", "updatedAt": "2026-07-23T12:00:00Z", "summary": "A long-inactive PancakeSwap liquidity provider lost about $2.96 million after signing a malicious EIP-7702 authorization, according to Specter monitoring reported by ChainCatcher on 23 July 2026. The attacker pulled about $1.48M of BSC-USD and $1.48M of BUSD liquidity, sent about $1.46M to Tornado Cash and still held about $1.48M in USDT at the time. An EIP-7702 authorization hands control of your whole account to a contract, so never sign one from a site you did not seek out." }, { "slug": "usdt-approval-phishing-999999-jul-2026", "title": "Ethereum user loses 999,999 USDT after signing a phishing token approval", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/usdt-approval-phishing-999999-jul-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/usdt-approval-phishing-999999-jul-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "ethereum" ], "method": "approval-phishing", "product": "Ethereum USDT holder", "tags": [ "ethereum", "approval-phishing", "usdt", "scam-sniffer", "multicall", "drainer" ], "amountUsd": 999999, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2026-07-08", "closedAt": "2026-07-09", "updatedAt": "2026-07-09T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 8 July 2026 an Ethereum user signed a phishing token approval and lost 999,999 USDT, nearly $1M, according to Scam Sniffer. The attacker used multicalls and pulled the funds out in three transactions. One signature on a fake site was enough to empty the stablecoin balance." }, { "slug": "zscaler-web-prompt-injection-ai-agent-crypto-payments-jul-2026", "title": "Zscaler: live web campaigns hide prompt injections telling browsing AI agents to make crypto payments", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/zscaler-web-prompt-injection-ai-agent-crypto-payments-jul-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/zscaler-web-prompt-injection-ai-agent-crypto-payments-jul-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "low", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "agent-target", "note": "The pages carry hidden instructions written for AI agents, telling them to make crypto payments or to trust a fake DeBank site." }, "chains": [ "multi-evm" ], "method": "agent-hijack", "product": "AI agents that browse the web and can pay", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "agent-hijack", "prompt-injection", "ai-agent", "agent-payments", "seo-poisoning", "typosquat", "debank", "zscaler", "ai" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-07-06", "closedAt": "2026-07-06", "updatedAt": "2026-07-06T12:00:00Z", "summary": "SecurityWeek reported on 6 July 2026 that Zscaler found two campaigns in use that plant hidden instructions on web pages for AI agents that can browse and pay. One used SEO poisoning to lure agents searching for a fake Python package, requests-secure-v2, backed by 10 GitHub repositories; the other typosquatted the DeFi portfolio tracker DeBank. In Zscaler's own tests 4 of 26 models were manipulated into making a payment and 2 mistook the fake DeBank site for the real one. No real losses were reported, but agents with spending power should only pay allow-listed recipients." }, { "slug": "fake-exchange-unlimited-approval-1-65m-jul-2026", "title": "Wallet holder loses $1.65M after signing an unlimited token approval on a fake exchange", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/fake-exchange-unlimited-approval-1-65m-jul-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/fake-exchange-unlimited-approval-1-65m-jul-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "multi-evm" ], "method": "approval-phishing", "product": "A crypto wallet holder using a fake exchange site", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "approval-phishing", "unlimited-approval", "fake-exchange", "sweeper", "phishing" ], "amountUsd": 1650000, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2026-07-03", "closedAt": "2026-07-09", "updatedAt": "2026-07-09T12:00:00Z", "summary": "In early July 2026 a crypto wallet holder connected to a fake exchange site and signed a malicious contract approval that gave the attacker unlimited spending rights. An automated sweeper then emptied the wallet of about $1.65 million. Anyone who signs approvals on unfamiliar trading sites is at risk; check and revoke token approvals you do not recognise." }, { "slug": "silent-swap-fake-google-notes-clipper-extension-jun-2026", "title": "'Silent Swap' clipper hides in a fake Google Notes browser extension to swap wallet addresses", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/silent-swap-fake-google-notes-clipper-extension-jun-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/silent-swap-fake-google-notes-clipper-extension-jun-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "medium", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "bitcoin", "ethereum", "solana" ], "method": "clipboard-hijacker", "product": "Chromium browser users infected via unsigned installers (fake 'Google Notes' extension)", "tags": [ "bitcoin", "ethereum", "solana", "clipboard-hijacker", "clipper", "browser-extension", "chrome", "chromium", "countloader", "mcafee", "etherhiding", "windows" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-06-30", "closedAt": "2026-06-30", "updatedAt": "2026-06-30T12:00:00Z", "summary": "McAfee researchers found unsigned .NET and Go installers, linked to the CountLoader malware loader, that force-install a fake 'Google Notes' extension into Chromium browsers. The extension reads the clipboard and replaces copied Bitcoin, Ethereum, Bitcoin Cash, XRP, Dash and Solana addresses with attacker addresses; it finds its control server through a smart contract. Anyone who finds an unknown 'Google Notes' extension should remove it and treat anything copied while it was installed as exposed. No loss total was published." }, { "slug": "polymarket-frontend-vendor-compromise-jun-2026", "title": "Polymarket front-end compromised through third-party vendor; about $3M of users' pUSD drained", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/polymarket-frontend-vendor-compromise-jun-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/polymarket-frontend-vendor-compromise-jun-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "polygon", "ethereum" ], "method": "front-end-hijack", "product": "Polymarket web app users", "tags": [ "polygon", "ethereum", "front-end-hijack", "polymarket", "supply-chain", "third-party-vendor", "injected-script", "pusd", "prediction-market" ], "amountUsd": 3000000, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-06-25", "closedAt": "2026-07-01", "updatedAt": "2026-07-01T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Polymarket disclosed on 25 June 2026 that a breached third-party vendor let attackers inject malicious code into its website for some users. Users who interacted with the compromised front-end had their pUSD (Polymarket's USDC-backed stablecoin) drained; Bubblemaps estimated about $3M taken from fewer than 15 users, and the funds were converted to ETH. Polymarket removed the code and says it will fully refund affected users." }, { "slug": "cryptobandits-usb-worm-clipper-tor-jun-2026", "title": "Microsoft: USB-spread 'CryptoBandits' clipper swaps wallet addresses and steals seed phrases over Tor", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/cryptobandits-usb-worm-clipper-tor-jun-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/cryptobandits-usb-worm-clipper-tor-jun-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "bitcoin", "ethereum", "tron" ], "method": "clipboard-hijacker", "product": "Windows users who open shortcut files from USB drives", "tags": [ "bitcoin", "ethereum", "tron", "clipboard-hijacker", "windows", "clipper", "usb-worm", "lnk", "tor", "microsoft", "cryptobandits", "seed-phrase" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-06-17", "closedAt": "2026-06-18", "updatedAt": "2026-06-18T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Microsoft reported a Windows crypto clipper, detected as Trojan:Win32/CryptoBandits, active since February 2026 and spreading through malicious shortcut (.lnk) files on USB drives. It checks the clipboard every half second, replaces copied Bitcoin, Tron and Monero addresses with lookalikes that share the first characters, grabs copied 12/24-word seed phrases and private keys, takes screenshots, and talks to its servers over Tor. Always check the whole address on your wallet or device screen before sending. No loss total was published." }, { "slug": "injective-sdk-ts-npm-key-stealer-jun-2026", "title": "Compromised Injective SDK on npm hooks key functions to steal seed phrases and private keys", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/injective-sdk-ts-npm-key-stealer-jun-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/injective-sdk-ts-npm-key-stealer-jun-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "multi-evm" ], "method": "supply-chain", "product": "npm package @injectivelabs/sdk-ts and 17 related @injectivelabs packages", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "supply-chain", "npm", "injective", "sdk", "github-compromise", "seed-phrase-theft", "developer" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-06-08", "closedAt": "2026-07-09", "updatedAt": "2026-07-09T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Attackers who compromised Injective Labs' GitHub repository published @injectivelabs/sdk-ts 1.20.21 to npm, along with 17 related @injectivelabs packages pinned to it. The malicious build hooked the fromMnemonic and fromHex functions and sent seed phrases and private keys to an Injective-looking endpoint whenever an app used them. It was downloaded about 310 times before being deprecated; no thefts had been reported. Any key or seed that passed through 1.20.21 should be treated as stolen; the clean version is 1.20.23." }, { "slug": "humanity-protocol-dev-machine-keys-jun-2026", "title": "Humanity Protocol loses $36M after malware on one developer machine exposes hot-wallet and Safe keys", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/humanity-protocol-dev-machine-keys-jun-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/humanity-protocol-dev-machine-keys-jun-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "partly-contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "ethereum", "bsc" ], "method": "key-leak", "product": "Humanity Protocol (H token) bridges and treasury", "tags": [ "ethereum", "bsc", "key-leak", "humanity-protocol", "malware", "infostealer", "developer-machine", "gnosis-safe", "multisig", "bridge", "h-token" ], "amountUsd": 36000000, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-06-08", "closedAt": "2026-06-15", "updatedAt": "2026-06-15T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 8 June 2026 an attacker used private keys taken from a single malware-infected developer machine to seize Humanity Protocol's admin hot wallet and its Safe multisigs on Ethereum (three of six keys) and BNB Chain (three of five). They drained about 141M H tokens, used malicious bridge upgrades to mint hundreds of millions more and sold them, a loss of more than $36M; H fell about 89% from its high. The team halted bridge deposits and withdrawals and told users not to touch the bridge or liquidity pools." }, { "slug": "ill-bloom-weak-seed-randomness-drains-may-2026", "title": "'Ill Bloom' weak-randomness flaw lets attackers sweep about $5M from software-wallet seeds, Solana included", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/ill-bloom-weak-seed-randomness-drains-may-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/ill-bloom-weak-seed-randomness-drains-may-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "solana", "bitcoin", "ethereum", "polygon", "tron" ], "method": "key-leak", "product": "Seed phrases made by some less widely used mobile software wallets (2018 onward)", "tags": [ "solana", "bitcoin", "ethereum", "polygon", "tron", "key-leak", "weak-randomness", "prng", "seed-phrase", "mobile-wallet", "coinspect", "ill-bloom" ], "amountUsd": 5000000, "victims": 431, "startedAt": "2026-05-27", "closedAt": "2026-07-06", "updatedAt": "2026-07-06T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Coinspect disclosed in July 2026 that some wallet software generated seed phrases with a weak random number generator, letting attackers guess the keys. On May 27, 2026, an attacker drained about $3.1 million from 431 of 2,114 vulnerable wallets in one address set, and about $2 million more moved later. That makes roughly $5 million known so far, across Bitcoin, Ethereum, Polygon, Rootstock, Tron and Solana. Hardware-wallet seeds appear unaffected. Less widely used mobile software wallets are the likeliest source, with affected wallets dating back to 2018. Check older addresses with Coinspect's checker and move funds to a freshly generated wallet." }, { "slug": "trapdoor-supply-chain-ai-assistant-config-poisoning-may-2026", "title": "TrapDoor packages on npm, PyPI and Crates.io steal wallet data and plant hidden prompts for AI coding tools", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/trapdoor-supply-chain-ai-assistant-config-poisoning-may-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/trapdoor-supply-chain-ai-assistant-config-poisoning-may-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "partly-contained", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "agent-target", "note": "The packages planted .cursorrules and CLAUDE.md files with hidden Unicode instructions meant to trick AI coding assistants into running steps that could find and exfiltrate secrets." }, "chains": [ "multi-evm" ], "method": "supply-chain", "product": "Developers installing packages from npm, PyPI and Crates.io", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "supply-chain", "trapdoor", "npm", "pypi", "crates-io", "ai-coding-agent", "cursor", "claude-code", "hidden-unicode", "infostealer", "ai" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-05-26", "closedAt": "2026-05-26", "updatedAt": "2026-05-26T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Socket reported in late May 2026 a campaign it named TrapDoor: more than 34 malicious packages and 384+ related versions across npm, PyPI and Crates.io that steal crypto wallet data and other developer secrets. The packages also tried to alter files that AI coding tools read, such as .cursorrules and CLAUDE.md, using hidden Unicode instructions meant to get the assistant to run scan-like steps that find and send out secrets. No confirmed losses or victim counts have been published. Developers who installed flagged packages should rotate credentials and move wallet funds." }, { "slug": "stablr-1of3-multisig-key-may-2026", "title": "StablR's EURR and USDR depeg after attacker takes over 1-of-3 minting multisig with a stolen key", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/stablr-1of3-multisig-key-may-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/stablr-1of3-multisig-key-may-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "partly-contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "ethereum" ], "method": "key-leak", "product": "StablR EURR and USDR stablecoins and holders", "tags": [ "ethereum", "key-leak", "stablr", "eurr", "usdr", "stablecoin", "multisig", "1-of-3", "private-key-compromise", "depeg" ], "amountUsd": 2800000, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-05-23", "closedAt": "2026-05-24", "updatedAt": "2026-05-24T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 23-24 May 2026 an attacker used the compromised private key of one signer on StablR's 1-of-3 minting multisig to add themselves as owner, replace the other owners and mint 8.35M USDR and 4.5M EURR, about $13.5M face value. They dumped about $10.4M of it on DEXs for ETH, with early net proceeds estimated at $2.8M, pushing USDR as low as $0.40 and EURR to about $0.85. ZachXBT said he helped freeze a six-figure sum." }, { "slug": "fake-cjup-jupiter-airdrop-drainer-may-2026", "title": "Fake $CJUP 'Jupuary' tokens airdropped to Solana wallets lead to drainer sites", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/fake-cjup-jupiter-airdrop-drainer-may-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/fake-cjup-jupiter-airdrop-drainer-may-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "medium", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "solana" ], "method": "fake-airdrop-site", "product": "Jupiter (JUP) community and Solana wallet users", "tags": [ "solana", "fake-airdrop-site", "jupiter", "jup", "jupuary", "airdrop", "spam-token", "impersonation", "solana-floor" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-05-22", "closedAt": "2026-05-22", "updatedAt": "2026-05-22T12:00:00Z", "summary": "In May 2026, Solana Floor warned that scammers were sending counterfeit '$CJUP' tokens to Solana wallets while impersonating Jupiter's Jupuary airdrop. The tokens point holders to phishing 'claim' sites that drain any wallet that connects. Losses were not quantified. Jupiter had not announced a new airdrop at the time, and its only official site is jup[.]ag. If a token you never bought appears with a claim link, ignore it." }, { "slug": "sigma-telegram-bot-wallets-key-leak-200k-may-2026", "title": "Trader loses over $200K from two SIGMA Telegram bot wallets in apparent private-key leak", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/sigma-telegram-bot-wallets-key-leak-200k-may-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/sigma-telegram-bot-wallets-key-leak-200k-may-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "ethereum", "base", "bsc" ], "method": "key-leak", "product": "SIGMA Telegram trading bot wallets (one trader)", "tags": [ "ethereum", "base", "bsc", "key-leak", "sigma", "telegram-bot", "trading-bot", "private-key", "fake-captcha" ], "amountUsd": 200000, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2026-05-11", "closedAt": "2026-05-11", "updatedAt": "2026-05-11T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 11 May 2026 a crypto trader lost over $200,000 across Ethereum, Base and BSC from two wallets created by the SIGMA Telegram trading bot; the largest losses were about $125,000 in POD on Base and $21,000 in FHE on BSC. An on-chain analyst said the drain used the private keys directly, with no token approval involved, while the victim's other wallets were untouched. The cause is unconfirmed; suggestions include fake CAPTCHA bots in Telegram, infostealer malware or a device compromise. Users of bot-generated wallets should keep balances small and never run 'verification' steps a Telegram bot asks for." }, { "slug": "grok-bankrbot-morse-code-prompt-injection-drb-may-2026", "title": "Encoded X post tricks Grok and Bankrbot into sending about 3 billion DRB tokens from Grok's wallet", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/grok-bankrbot-morse-code-prompt-injection-drb-may-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/grok-bankrbot-morse-code-prompt-injection-drb-may-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "partly-contained", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "agent-target", "note": "An encoded post got Grok to output a transfer command that the Bankrbot agent then executed from Grok's wallet, which reports describe as prompt injection across two chained AI agents." }, "chains": [ "base" ], "method": "agent-hijack", "product": "Grok-linked Bankr wallet (Bankrbot on X)", "tags": [ "base", "agent-hijack", "grok", "bankr", "bankrbot", "prompt-injection", "ai-agent", "x-replies", "nft-permissions", "drb", "ai" ], "amountUsd": 155000, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2026-05-04", "closedAt": "2026-05-13", "updatedAt": "2026-05-13T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 4 May 2026 an attacker drained about 3 billion DRB tokens, worth roughly $150,000 to $200,000 depending on the estimate, from a Bankr wallet linked to xAI's Grok on Base. Reports say the attacker first sent the wallet a free Bankr Club membership NFT that widened what it could authorize, then posted a Morse-coded message; Grok decoded it and the Bankr automation treated Grok's reply as a valid transfer order. No private key, smart contract or malware was involved, and some funds were later returned. An AI's text output should never count as permission to move money." }, { "slug": "femitbot-telegram-mini-app-fraud-may-2026", "title": "FEMITBOT: fake Telegram bots and Mini Apps impersonate crypto brands to take deposits and push Android malware", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/femitbot-telegram-mini-app-fraud-may-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/femitbot-telegram-mini-app-fraud-may-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "multi-evm" ], "method": "fake-telegram-bot", "product": "Telegram users targeted with fake crypto and investment bots (impersonating MoonPay and other brands)", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "fake-telegram-bot", "telegram", "telegram-mini-app", "fake-bot", "femitbot", "investment-scam", "android-malware", "brand-impersonation", "moonpay" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-05-03", "closedAt": "2026-05-03", "updatedAt": "2026-05-03T12:00:00Z", "summary": "CTM360 found a shared fraud platform, FEMITBOT, behind many Telegram bots that open Mini App phishing pages inside Telegram, impersonating crypto services such as MoonPay (other outlets also list Bitget, OKX, Binance and Fragment) plus streaming and AI brands. Victims see fake balances and earnings and are told to deposit money or recruit others to 'unlock' withdrawals; some Mini Apps also push Android APK malware. No total losses have been published. Do not start bots or open Mini Apps from ads or unsolicited invites, and never pay to withdraw 'earnings'." }, { "slug": "wasabi-protocol-deployer-key-apr-2026", "title": "Wasabi Protocol vaults drained of $4.5M after attacker uses a compromised deployer admin key", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/wasabi-protocol-deployer-key-apr-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/wasabi-protocol-deployer-key-apr-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "ethereum", "base" ], "method": "key-leak", "product": "Wasabi Protocol vaults and LP holders (Ethereum, Base)", "tags": [ "ethereum", "base", "key-leak", "wasabi-protocol", "admin-key", "deployer-key", "proxy-upgrade", "perps", "blockaid" ], "amountUsd": 4550000, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-04-30", "closedAt": "2026-04-30", "updatedAt": "2026-04-30T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 30 April 2026 an attacker used the compromised key of wasabideployer.eth, an ordinary wallet that held Wasabi's only ADMIN_ROLE, to grant themselves admin rights with no delay. A helper contract then upgraded the perp vaults and Long Pool on Ethereum and Base to malicious code that emptied them. CoinDesk put losses at about $4.55M; Blockaid flagged the attack. Wasabi LP holders were urged to revoke approvals to the vault contracts." }, { "slug": "kaspersky-fakewallet-26-ios-apps-apr-2026", "title": "Kaspersky finds 26 'FakeWallet' apps on Apple's App Store stealing wallet recovery phrases", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/kaspersky-fakewallet-26-ios-apps-apr-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/kaspersky-fakewallet-26-ios-apps-apr-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "partly-contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "multi-evm", "bitcoin", "tron" ], "method": "fake-app", "product": "iPhone users who installed fake MetaMask, Ledger, Trust Wallet, Coinbase, TokenPocket, imToken or Bitpie apps", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "bitcoin", "tron", "fake-app", "ios", "app-store", "kaspersky", "sparkkitty", "metamask", "ledger", "trust-wallet", "coinbase", "seed-phrase", "developer-profile" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-04-20", "closedAt": "2026-04-20", "updatedAt": "2026-04-20T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Kaspersky found 26 decoy apps on Apple's App Store (games, calculators, to-do lists) that opened a fake App Store page and pushed users to sideload trojanized versions of MetaMask, Ledger, Trust Wallet, Coinbase, TokenPocket, imToken and Bitpie. The trojanized hot wallets captured recovery phrases during wallet creation or restore, and the Ledger lure asked for the phrase directly. The campaign ran since at least fall 2025, mostly against users in China, and is attributed with moderate confidence to the SparkKitty actors; Kaspersky reported all apps to Apple. No loss total was published." }, { "slug": "cow-swap-dns-hijack-apr-2026", "title": "CoW Swap domain hijacked via registrar social engineering; cloned site drains users through approvals", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/cow-swap-dns-hijack-apr-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/cow-swap-dns-hijack-apr-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "ethereum" ], "method": "front-end-hijack", "product": "CoW Swap (swap.cow.fi) users", "tags": [ "ethereum", "front-end-hijack", "cow-swap", "dns-hijack", "registrar", "social-engineering", "approval-phishing", "dex" ], "amountUsd": 1200000, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-04-14", "closedAt": "2026-05-13", "updatedAt": "2026-05-13T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 14 April 2026 attackers took control of the domain for swap.cow.fi and sent visitors to a cloned CoW Swap interface that asked for malicious token approvals. CoW DAO paused its backend and APIs and told users to revoke approvals made after 14:54 UTC; the protocol's smart contracts were not affected. Early estimates were about $500K drained; Halborn later put user losses at about $1.2M and said the registrar had been social-engineered." }, { "slug": "notnullosx-mac-stealer-trojanized-ledger-trezor-apr-2026", "title": "notnullOSX Mac stealer swaps Ledger Live and Trezor apps for trojanized copies", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/notnullosx-mac-stealer-trojanized-ledger-trezor-apr-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/notnullosx-mac-stealer-trojanized-ledger-trezor-apr-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "bitcoin", "multi-evm" ], "method": "fake-app", "product": "Mac users with Ledger Live, Trezor Suite or desktop/extension wallets", "tags": [ "bitcoin", "multi-evm", "fake-app", "macos", "infostealer", "ledger", "trezor", "clickfix", "google-ads", "youtube", "moonlock", "notnullosx" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-04-10", "closedAt": "2026-04-10", "updatedAt": "2026-04-10T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Moonlock found notnullOSX, a macOS stealer spread through Google Ads, promoted YouTube videos and fake wallpaper sites using ClickFix-style 'paste this in Terminal' instructions. Its ReplaceApp module replaces the user's Ledger Live or Trezor app with a trojanized copy to catch the recovery phrase, and it also copies desktop and browser-extension wallet data. Operators reportedly target people holding more than $10,000 in crypto. No loss total was published." }, { "slug": "fake-ledger-live-mac-app-store-9-5m-apr-2026", "title": "Fake Ledger Live app on Apple's Mac App Store stole about $9.5M in seed-phrase thefts", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/fake-ledger-live-mac-app-store-9-5m-apr-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/fake-ledger-live-mac-app-store-9-5m-apr-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "partly-contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "bitcoin", "ethereum", "tron", "solana" ], "method": "fake-app", "product": "Ledger users who installed 'Ledger Live' from the Mac App Store", "tags": [ "bitcoin", "ethereum", "tron", "solana", "fake-app", "ledger", "app-store", "macos", "apple", "seed-phrase", "zachxbt", "kucoin" ], "amountUsd": 9500000, "victims": 50, "startedAt": "2026-04-08", "closedAt": "2026-04-15", "updatedAt": "2026-04-15T12:00:00Z", "summary": "A fake Ledger Live app for macOS, published on Apple's App Store under the name 'Leva Heal Limited', asked users for their recovery phrase and drained about $9.5M from roughly 50 victims between 8 and 11 April 2026. Apple removed the app and terminated the developer account; KuCoin froze accounts used to launder part of the funds. Ledger's desktop app is only distributed from Ledger's own website, and no Ledger software ever asks for your recovery phrase." }, { "slug": "drift-protocol-durable-nonce-admin-takeover-apr-2026", "title": "Drift Protocol drained of $270M+ after signers pre-signed durable-nonce admin transactions", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/drift-protocol-durable-nonce-admin-takeover-apr-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/drift-protocol-durable-nonce-admin-takeover-apr-2026.json", "status": "live", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "agent-attack", "note": "TRM Labs investigator Nick Carlsen, a former FBI analyst, assessed it highly likely that the attackers used AI to pick targets and design the exploit, as The Next Web reported citing Bloomberg; this is an expert assessment, not confirmed." }, "chains": [ "solana" ], "method": "durable-nonce", "product": "Drift Protocol (Security Council multisig)", "tags": [ "solana", "durable-nonce", "drift", "multisig", "security-council", "social-engineering", "admin-takeover", "cctp", "wormhole", "admin-key", "dprk", "tornado-cash", "laundering", "ai" ], "amountUsd": 285000000, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-04-01", "closedAt": "2026-04-01", "updatedAt": "2026-10-22T21:53:35.016Z", "summary": "On Apr 1, 2026, an attacker took admin control of the Solana perps exchange Drift and drained its vaults of at least $270 million; SlowMist lists $285 million. Weeks earlier, Security Council signers had been led into 'unauthorized or misrepresented' approvals. Because those transactions used durable nonces, they stayed valid until the attacker chose to submit them. The funds were bridged to Ethereum, including more than $230 million in USDC via Circle's CCTP. No code bug was needed. The lesson for teams is that any durable-nonce signing request is high risk." }, { "slug": "latinum-wallet-mcp-pypi-solana-key-exfiltration-mar-2026", "title": "Solana wallet MCP server on PyPI sent users' private keys to a remote server", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/latinum-wallet-mcp-pypi-solana-key-exfiltration-mar-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/latinum-wallet-mcp-pypi-solana-key-exfiltration-mar-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "medium", "threatStatus": "partly-contained", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "agent-target", "note": "The package was an MCP wallet server for AI agents; it auto-registered itself as an MCP server for Claude and sent the Solana private key to a remote server." }, "chains": [ "solana" ], "method": "supply-chain", "product": "latinum-wallet-mcp (PyPI)", "tags": [ "solana", "supply-chain", "mcp", "mcp-server", "pypi", "claude", "ai-agent", "private-key", "ai" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-03-31", "closedAt": "2026-03-31", "updatedAt": "2026-03-31T12:00:00Z", "summary": "An advisory published on 31 March 2026 flagged latinum-wallet-mcp, a PyPI package that runs a Solana wallet as an MCP server for AI agents, as malicious. From version 0.0.32 it sent the wallet's private key, along with other metrics, to a remote server during wallet setup, and from 0.0.34 it added itself as an MCP server for Claude on import; none of this was in the public GitHub code. Versions 0.0.32 to 0.0.36 are listed as affected. Anyone who installed them should treat that Solana key as stolen and move funds to a new wallet." }, { "slug": "npm-galedonovan-solana-key-stealers-mar-2026", "title": "Five typosquatted npm packages hook Base58 decoding to steal Solana and Ethereum private keys", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/npm-galedonovan-solana-key-stealers-mar-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/npm-galedonovan-solana-key-stealers-mar-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "medium", "threatStatus": "partly-contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "solana", "ethereum" ], "method": "supply-chain", "product": "npm packages raydium-bs58, base-x-64, bs58-basic, ethersproject-wallet, base_xd", "tags": [ "solana", "ethereum", "supply-chain", "npm", "typosquat", "bs58", "base58", "telegram-c2", "developers", "raydium" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-03-26", "closedAt": "2026-03-26", "updatedAt": "2026-03-26T12:00:00Z", "summary": "In March 2026, Cyber Press reported five malicious npm packages from the account 'galedonovan', aimed at crypto developers: raydium-bs58, base-x-64, bs58-basic, ethersproject-wallet and base_xd. The Solana packages intercept Base58 decode() calls used to load keypairs and send the private key in plain text to a Telegram bot, while the app keeps working normally. The Ethereum package hooks the Wallet constructor. base_xd was pulled within five minutes, but the other four were still live when the report came out. Developers who installed any of them should rotate keys and move funds." }, { "slug": "litellm-pypi-teampcp-credential-wallet-stealer-mar-2026", "title": "Compromised LiteLLM releases on PyPI steal cloud keys and crypto wallet data from AI developers", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/litellm-pypi-teampcp-credential-wallet-stealer-mar-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/litellm-pypi-teampcp-credential-wallet-stealer-mar-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "agent-target", "note": "The trojanized package was LiteLLM, a gateway library used to connect AI apps and agents to LLMs, so an AI tool was the delivery route; no AI model was manipulated." }, "chains": [ "multi-evm" ], "method": "supply-chain", "product": "LiteLLM on PyPI", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "supply-chain", "litellm", "pypi", "teampcp", "llm-gateway", "ai-tooling", "infostealer", "trivy", "ai" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-03-24", "closedAt": "2026-03-24", "updatedAt": "2026-03-24T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 24 March 2026 attackers tracked as TeamPCP published LiteLLM 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 to PyPI with hidden code that runs on import, and in 1.82.8 whenever Python starts. LiteLLM is a popular open-source gateway that AI apps and agents use to reach many LLM providers, with over 3.4 million downloads a day. The payload collected SSH keys, cloud credentials, Kubernetes secrets, .env files and crypto wallet data and sent them to a lookalike domain. Both versions were removed; anyone who installed them should rotate secrets and move funds from wallets on affected machines." }, { "slug": "resolv-usr-minting-key-compromise-mar-2026", "title": "Resolv's USR stablecoin depegs after attacker uses a compromised signing key to mint 80M unbacked tokens", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/resolv-usr-minting-key-compromise-mar-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/resolv-usr-minting-key-compromise-mar-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "ethereum" ], "method": "key-leak", "product": "Resolv Labs USR stablecoin and holders", "tags": [ "ethereum", "key-leak", "resolv", "usr", "stablecoin", "depeg", "private-key-compromise", "off-chain-signer", "minting" ], "amountUsd": 24500000, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-03-21", "closedAt": "2026-04-01", "updatedAt": "2026-04-01T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 21 March 2026 an attacker obtained a privileged private key used by Resolv's off-chain minting service, deposited about $100K-$200K in USDC and minted about 80M USR, which the contracts did not cap. They swapped out for about 11,408 ETH, roughly $24.5M, and USR fell to about 26 cents. Resolv paused its app, offered the attacker a 10% bounty and asked holders not to trade USR while it works on recovery." }, { "slug": "bonk-fun-domain-hijack-drainer-mar-2026", "title": "Bonk.fun domain hijacked to serve wallet drainer behind fake terms-of-service prompt", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/bonk-fun-domain-hijack-drainer-mar-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/bonk-fun-domain-hijack-drainer-mar-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "partly-contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "solana" ], "method": "front-end-hijack", "product": "Bonk.fun launchpad users", "tags": [ "solana", "front-end-hijack", "bonk-fun", "launchpad", "domain-hijack", "fake-tos", "signature-phishing", "bonk" ], "amountUsd": 30000, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-03-11", "closedAt": "2026-03-12", "updatedAt": "2026-03-12T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On Mar 11, 2026, attackers who had hijacked a Bonk.fun team account put a wallet drainer on the Solana launchpad's official domain. Visitors were asked to sign a fake terms-of-service message, and those who signed had their wallets drained. The team called losses minimal; SlowMist's database puts them at about $30,000. Only people who signed the fake message on the domain after the hijack were affected. If you signed it, move remaining funds to a new wallet." }, { "slug": "inferno-angelferno-drainer-still-active-oct-2026", "title": "Report: Inferno/AngelFerno drainer still active in 2026, bought Purple Drainer in March", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/inferno-angelferno-drainer-still-active-oct-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/inferno-angelferno-drainer-still-active-oct-2026.json", "status": "live", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "multi-evm" ], "method": "drainer-kit", "product": "Web3 users targeted by Inferno/AngelFerno affiliate phishing sites and domain takeovers", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "drainer-kit", "drainer-as-a-service", "inferno-drainer", "angel-drainer", "angelferno", "purple-drainer", "permit2", "cloudflare-workers", "ransom-isac" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-03-01", "closedAt": null, "updatedAt": "2026-10-05T12:00:00Z", "summary": "A Ransom-ISAC report published on 5 October 2026 says the Inferno drainer ecosystem, now branded AngelFerno after merging with Angel Drainer, was still running in summer 2026 with thousands of affiliates. It says AngelFerno announced it had bought Purple Drainer in March 2026, that its factory has deployed over 17,000 single-use drainer contracts, and that it targets 165 tokens on 11 EVM chains (with Solana, TRON, SUI and XRP variants). The report ties it to domain takeovers including CoW Protocol in April 2026 (about $1.2M lost) and notes a May 2026 key rotation that locked the operators out of their own command contract for about 23 days." }, { "slug": "promptmink-ai-assisted-commit-malicious-npm-trading-agent-apr-2026", "title": "Claude-assisted commit adds a North Korea-linked wallet-stealing npm package to an AI crypto trading agent", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/promptmink-ai-assisted-commit-malicious-npm-trading-agent-apr-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/promptmink-ai-assisted-commit-malicious-npm-trading-agent-apr-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "medium", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "agent-target", "note": "The malicious dependency entered an AI trading agent through a commit co-authored by Claude Opus, and ReversingLabs assesses the attackers wrote promotional package pages to lure AI coding agents." }, "chains": [ "solana" ], "method": "supply-chain", "product": "AI trading agent projects and Web3 developers on npm", "tags": [ "solana", "supply-chain", "npm", "pypi", "ai-coding-agent", "claude", "ai-trading-bot", "famous-chollima", "north-korea", "dprk", "promptmink", "ai" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-02-28", "closedAt": "2026-04-29", "updatedAt": "2026-04-29T12:00:00Z", "summary": "ReversingLabs reported on 29 April 2026 that a 28 February commit to openpaw-graveyard, an autonomous crypto trading agent built for Solana, was co-authored by Claude Opus and added a bait package (@solana-launchpad/sdk) that silently pulled in the malicious @validate-sdk/v2. The payload steals .env and JSON files and crypto wallet credentials, and adds attacker SSH keys for remote access. ReversingLabs ties the campaign, 60+ packages and 300+ versions over about seven months, to North Korea's Famous Chollima and believes it deliberately targets AI coding agents. No losses were reported; check lockfiles for the named packages and rotate keys on affected machines." }, { "slug": "arkanix-stealer-llm-assisted-crypto-wallets-feb-2026", "title": "Arkanix stealer, likely built with LLM help, targeted crypto wallets before its makers shut it down", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/arkanix-stealer-llm-assisted-crypto-wallets-feb-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/arkanix-stealer-llm-assisted-crypto-wallets-feb-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "low", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "ai-malware", "note": "Kaspersky says the stealer contains probable traces of LLM-assisted development and was likely an AI-assisted experiment." }, "chains": [ "multi-evm" ], "method": null, "product": "People infected with the Arkanix stealer (Exodus, Atomic and browser wallet users)", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "infostealer", "malware-as-a-service", "arkanix", "exodus", "atomic-wallet", "llm-assisted", "kaspersky", "discord", "ai" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-02-24", "closedAt": "2026-02-24", "updatedAt": "2026-02-24T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Kaspersky analysed Arkanix, a malware-as-a-service info-stealer advertised on dark-web forums and Discord from October 2025, as Security Affairs reported on 24 February 2026. It took crypto wallet data, with paid builds offering injection into Exodus and Atomic wallets, along with browser passwords, cookies, Telegram sessions and Discord logins. Kaspersky says the code shows probable traces of LLM-assisted development, and the operators shut the project down about two months after launch. No victim counts or losses were published." }, { "slug": "lobstar-wilde-ai-agent-sends-memecoin-holdings-feb-2026", "title": "AI trading agent Lobstar Wilde sends about $250K in tokens to an X user who asked it for 4 SOL", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/lobstar-wilde-ai-agent-sends-memecoin-holdings-feb-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/lobstar-wilde-ai-agent-sends-memecoin-holdings-feb-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "agent-target", "note": "The autonomous AI agent acted on an X reply asking it for 4 SOL and sent about 53 million tokens instead; the bot called it an accident, and the decimal-error explanation is speculation, not confirmed." }, "chains": [ "solana" ], "method": "agent-hijack", "product": "Lobstar Wilde, an experimental AI trading agent on X", "tags": [ "solana", "agent-hijack", "ai-agent", "ai-trading-bot", "lobstar", "x-replies", "social-engineering", "memecoin", "ai" ], "amountUsd": 250000, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2026-02-22", "closedAt": "2026-02-22", "updatedAt": "2026-02-22T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 22 February 2026 Lobstar Wilde, an experimental AI trading agent with its own Solana wallet built by an OpenAI developer, answered an X reply asking for 4 SOL for a relative's medical treatment. Instead of a small amount it sent about 53 million LOBSTAR tokens, roughly 5% of supply and about $250,000 at the time, and the recipient sold them. The bot called it an accident; a decimal error was suggested by an X user but not confirmed by the creator. Agents that can send funds in response to public replies need hard per-transfer caps and human approval." }, { "slug": "iotex-iotube-bridge-key-compromise-feb-2026", "title": "IoTeX ioTube bridge drained of about $4.4M after attacker abused a compromised employee machine", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/iotex-iotube-bridge-key-compromise-feb-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/iotex-iotube-bridge-key-compromise-feb-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "partly-contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "ethereum" ], "method": "key-leak", "product": "IoTeX ioTube bridge (Ethereum side)", "tags": [ "ethereum", "key-leak", "iotex", "iotube", "bridge", "social-engineering", "validator-key", "malicious-upgrade" ], "amountUsd": 4400000, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-02-21", "closedAt": "2026-02-24", "updatedAt": "2026-03-28T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 21 February 2026 an attacker who had compromised an IoTeX employee's machine, reportedly through social engineering, upgraded the ioTube bridge's Ethereum-side Validator contract to a malicious version. That let them drain about $4.4M in bridge reserves (WBTC, ETH, USDC, USDT, DAI and others) and mint 410M CIOTX. IoTeX froze about 45M IOTX in attacker wallets, paused its chain for three days and opened a claims portal for affected users." }, { "slug": "unc1069-deepfake-ceo-zoom-clickfix-crypto-fintech-feb-2026", "title": "North Korea's UNC1069 used an apparent deepfake CEO on a fake Zoom call to infect a crypto fintech", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/unc1069-deepfake-ceo-zoom-clickfix-crypto-fintech-feb-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/unc1069-deepfake-ceo-zoom-clickfix-crypto-fintech-feb-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "medium", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "ai-lure", "note": "The victim reported an apparent deepfake video of a crypto CEO on the call; Mandiant could not verify it forensically but notes UNC1069's known use of AI tools to edit images or video and of Gemini for tooling and research." }, "chains": [ "multi-evm" ], "method": "social-engineering", "product": "Crypto and DeFi fintech staff on macOS", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "social-engineering", "dprk", "unc1069", "masan", "cryptocore", "deepfake", "zoom", "fake-meeting", "clickfix", "telegram", "calendly", "macos", "mandiant", "gemini", "ai" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2026-02-09", "closedAt": "2026-02-09", "updatedAt": "2026-02-09T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Mandiant reported on 9 February 2026 an intrusion at a crypto-sector fintech that began with a message from a crypto executive's hijacked Telegram account and a Calendly invite to a spoofed Zoom meeting. On the call the victim saw what appeared to be a deepfake of another crypto company's CEO, was told their audio was broken and was talked into running 'troubleshooting' commands (ClickFix). Those commands installed seven malware families on macOS that collect credentials, browser and Telegram data to enable crypto theft. Mandiant tied it to the North Korea-linked group UNC1069 and reported no stolen amount." }, { "slug": "openclaw-clawhub-malicious-skills-solana-phantom-feb-2026", "title": "Malicious OpenClaw AI-agent skills pose as Solana and Phantom tools to steal wallet keys", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/openclaw-clawhub-malicious-skills-solana-phantom-feb-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/openclaw-clawhub-malicious-skills-solana-phantom-feb-2026.json", "status": "live", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "partly-contained", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "agent-target", "note": "Malicious skills for the OpenClaw AI agent posed as Solana, Phantom and other crypto tools; some delivered the AMOS stealer and Solana keys were exposed in plain-text keypair files." }, "chains": [ "solana", "multi-evm" ], "method": "supply-chain", "product": "OpenClaw (ClawHub) skill users", "tags": [ "solana", "multi-evm", "supply-chain", "openclaw", "clawhub", "ai-agent", "skills", "amos-stealer", "macos", "infostealer", "phantom", "ai" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-02-05", "closedAt": null, "updatedAt": "2026-10-22T21:53:35.016Z", "summary": "Bitdefender found that about 17% of the OpenClaw (ClawHub) AI-agent skills it analyzed in the first week of February 2026 behaved maliciously. Solana-themed skills made up 9.3% of the malicious set and Phantom-wallet skills 8.2%. Some skills told users to run fake installers that dropped the AMOS macOS stealer. Solana skills that read SOLANA_KEYPAIR_PATH can expose the plain-text keypair file that holds a wallet's private key. Payloads were staged on 91.92.242[.]30 and an impersonated OpenClaw GitHub repo. Anyone who installed crypto skills and ran their setup commands should move funds to a new wallet." }, { "slug": "arbitrum-dao-x-account-hijack-feb-2026", "title": "Hijacked Arbitrum DAO X account posts fake 'snapshot confirmed' airdrop linking to phishing site", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/arbitrum-dao-x-account-hijack-feb-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/arbitrum-dao-x-account-hijack-feb-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "medium", "threatStatus": "partly-contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "arbitrum" ], "method": "fake-airdrop-site", "product": "Arbitrum DAO followers on X", "tags": [ "arbitrum", "fake-airdrop-site", "x-account-hack", "fake-airdrop", "social-media", "phishing" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-02-03", "closedAt": "2026-02-03", "updatedAt": "2026-02-03T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 3 February 2026 attackers took over Arbitrum DAO's official governance account on X (@arbitrumdao_gov) and posted a fake 'Arbitrum snapshot confirmed' airdrop linking to gov-arbitrum[.]com, a lookalike site with a 'Connect Wallet' prompt. Arbitrum told users not to click links from the account and said the protocol and funds were not affected. No losses had been reported at the time." }, { "slug": "spl-token-owner-reassignment-false-deposit-feb-2026", "title": "SPL token-account ownership reassignment used to fake deposits at a Solana custodian", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/spl-token-owner-reassignment-false-deposit-feb-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/spl-token-owner-reassignment-false-deposit-feb-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "low", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "solana" ], "method": "token-owner-swap", "product": "Liminal Custody Solana deposit monitoring (custodian, exchange-style deposit addresses)", "tags": [ "solana", "token-owner-swap", "spl-token", "setauthority", "false-top-up", "custody", "deposit-spoofing" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-02-01", "closedAt": "2026-03-31", "updatedAt": "2026-03-31T12:00:00Z", "summary": "In February 2026 Liminal Custody's monitoring caught two low-value attempts that used SetAuthority to reassign an attacker's temporary SPL token account to a customer's deposit address after a net-zero transfer, so systems that look up owners through RPC could credit a deposit that never happened. Liminal says no erroneous credit occurred and no customer funds were affected. Exchanges, custodians and payment apps on Solana should verify the expected associated token account and real balance increases before crediting." }, { "slug": "step-finance-treasury-drain-jan-2026", "title": "Step Finance treasury wallets drained of about $40M; Solana platform later shuts down", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/step-finance-treasury-drain-jan-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/step-finance-treasury-drain-jan-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "solana" ], "method": "key-leak", "product": "Step Finance treasury and fee wallets", "tags": [ "solana", "key-leak", "treasury", "team-wallet", "private-key", "step-finance", "solanafloor", "remora", "staking" ], "amountUsd": 40000000, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-01-31", "closedAt": "2026-01-31", "updatedAt": "2026-02-23T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On Jan 31, 2026, Step Finance reported a breach of some of its treasury wallets. CertiK saw 261,854 SOL (about $27 million) unstaked and transferred, and Step later put the total near $40 million. SlowMist's hack database classifies the cause as a private key leak. Step, SolanaFloor and Remora Markets announced a wind-down on Feb 23, 2026, with a STEP buyback based on a pre-hack snapshot and a USDC redemption process for Remora rToken holders. Holders should use only official Step channels for the buyback and redemption." }, { "slug": "address-poisoning-4556-eth-jan-2026", "title": "Investor sends 4,556 ETH ($12.25M) to a poisoned lookalike address planted months earlier", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/address-poisoning-4556-eth-jan-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/address-poisoning-4556-eth-jan-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "ethereum" ], "method": "address-poisoning", "product": "Ethereum whale wallet", "tags": [ "ethereum", "address-poisoning", "eth", "dusting", "lookalike-address", "tornado-cash", "scam-sniffer", "whale" ], "amountUsd": 12250000, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2026-01-30", "closedAt": "2026-01-31", "updatedAt": "2026-01-31T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 30 January 2026 a victim sent 4,556 ETH, about $12.25M, to a lookalike of a regular counterparty's address. The attacker had seeded it into the victim's history with fake token transfers from February 2025 and ETH dust from October 2025; it matched the real address's first and last four characters. About 33 minutes later the ETH was swept to a new wallet, and the next day all of it went into Tornado Cash. Scam Sniffer flagged the loss." }, { "slug": "konni-ai-generated-backdoor-blockchain-developers-jan-2026", "title": "North Korea-linked KONNI targets blockchain developers with an AI-generated PowerShell backdoor", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/konni-ai-generated-backdoor-blockchain-developers-jan-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/konni-ai-generated-backdoor-blockchain-developers-jan-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "medium", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "ai-malware", "note": "Check Point Research describes the payload as an AI-generated PowerShell backdoor." }, "chains": [ "multi-evm" ], "method": "social-engineering", "product": "Blockchain and crypto developers and engineering teams (Asia-Pacific)", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "social-engineering", "dprk", "konni", "powershell", "backdoor", "ai-generated-code", "blockchain-developers", "phishing", "check-point", "ai" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-01-22", "closedAt": "2026-01-22", "updatedAt": "2026-01-22T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Check Point Research reported on 22 January 2026 that the North Korea-linked group KONNI, long focused on South Korean government targets, is now going after developers and engineering teams on blockchain and crypto projects. Phishing lures dressed up as project documentation deliver a PowerShell backdoor that Check Point calls AI-generated, with activity seen in Japan, Australia and India. A compromised developer can expose source code, infrastructure and blockchain credentials. No losses were reported." }, { "slug": "snap-store-fake-wallet-updates-expired-domains-jan-2026", "title": "Hijacked Snap Store publisher accounts push fake Exodus, Ledger Live and Trust Wallet apps", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/snap-store-fake-wallet-updates-expired-domains-jan-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/snap-store-fake-wallet-updates-expired-domains-jan-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "bitcoin", "multi-evm" ], "method": "fake-app", "product": "Linux users installing wallet apps from the Snap Store", "tags": [ "bitcoin", "multi-evm", "fake-app", "linux", "snap-store", "snapcraft", "exodus", "ledger", "trust-wallet", "slowmist", "seed-phrase", "expired-domain", "account-takeover" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-01-21", "closedAt": "2026-01-21", "updatedAt": "2026-01-21T12:00:00Z", "summary": "SlowMist reported that attackers re-registered expired domains belonging to established Linux Snap Store publishers, reset the publisher accounts, and pushed updates that turned trusted apps into fake Exodus, Ledger Live and Trust Wallet clients. The fake apps ask for the wallet recovery phrase and send it to the attackers. Linux users who installed wallet apps from the Snap Store should check the publisher and never type a recovery phrase into a desktop app. No loss total was published." }, { "slug": "meteora-fake-otc-escrow-1-5m-jan-2026", "title": "Meteora loses $1.5M USDC to fake OTC escrow in double-impersonation scam", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/meteora-fake-otc-escrow-1-5m-jan-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/meteora-fake-otc-escrow-1-5m-jan-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "solana" ], "method": "social-engineering", "product": "Meteora treasury (OTC buyback of MET)", "tags": [ "solana", "social-engineering", "otc", "escrow", "impersonation", "treasury", "meteora", "usdc" ], "amountUsd": 1500000, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2026-01-17", "closedAt": "2026-01-17", "updatedAt": "2026-04-30T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On Jan 17, 2026, the Solana DEX Meteora sent $1.5 million in USDC to what it believed was a trusted escrow wallet for an OTC buyback of its MET token. Scammers had impersonated the seller to Meteora and Meteora to the seller, so the 'escrow' address was theirs. The funds were reportedly moved through KuCoin. No smart contract was exploited and no user funds were involved. Meteora disclosed the loss in its Q1 2026 token holder report. Teams doing OTC deals should confirm counterparties and escrow addresses over a separate, known channel." }, { "slug": "address-poisoning-514k-usdt-jan-2026", "title": "Ethereum user loses $514K in USDT to address poisoning two minutes after a test transfer", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/address-poisoning-514k-usdt-jan-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/address-poisoning-514k-usdt-jan-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "ethereum" ], "method": "address-poisoning", "product": "Ethereum USDT holder", "tags": [ "ethereum", "address-poisoning", "usdt", "test-transaction", "lookalike-address", "cyvers" ], "amountUsd": 514000, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2026-01-16", "closedAt": "2026-01-16", "updatedAt": "2026-01-16T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 16 January 2026 a victim sent a 5,000 USDT test transfer and, two minutes later, 509,000 USDT to a lookalike Ethereum address planted by an address-poisoning scammer, a total loss of about $514,000. The intended address ended in D3E6F; the fake ended in f3e6F and differed only in the middle characters wallets usually hide. Cyvers flagged the theft." }, { "slug": "polycule-polymarket-telegram-bot-hack-jan-2026", "title": "Polycule, a Telegram trading bot for Polymarket, hacked for about $230K of user funds", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/polycule-polymarket-telegram-bot-hack-jan-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/polycule-polymarket-telegram-bot-hack-jan-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "polygon" ], "method": "key-leak", "product": "Polycule Telegram trading bot users (Polymarket, Polygon)", "tags": [ "polygon", "key-leak", "polycule", "polymarket", "telegram-bot", "custodial-bot", "trading-bot" ], "amountUsd": 230000, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2026-01-13", "closedAt": "2026-01-14", "updatedAt": "2026-01-14T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Polycule, a Telegram bot for trading on Polymarket, confirmed on 13 Jan 2026 that it had been hacked and that about $230,000 of user funds held in bot-managed Polygon wallets was taken. The team took the bot offline and promised a patch and compensation; no official root cause was published, and some rivals called it a rug pull. Custodial Telegram bots keep users' private keys on their own servers, so one breach can drain every user at once. Keep only small trading balances in any bot wallet." }, { "slug": "permit-phishing-1-08m-aethlbtc-jan-2026", "title": "User loses $1.08M in Aave LBTC (aEthLBTC) to a malicious permit signature", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/permit-phishing-1-08m-aethlbtc-jan-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/permit-phishing-1-08m-aethlbtc-jan-2026.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "ethereum" ], "method": "permit-phishing", "product": "An Aave aEthLBTC holder", "tags": [ "ethereum", "permit-phishing", "permit", "aave", "lbtc", "atoken", "tornado-cash", "scam-sniffer", "slowmist" ], "amountUsd": 1080000, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2026-01-03", "closedAt": "2026-01-03", "updatedAt": "2026-01-03T12:00:00Z", "summary": "A user lost about 12 aEthLBTC (Aave's wrapped LBTC position on Ethereum), worth about $1.08 million, after signing a malicious permit signature, Scam Sniffer flagged on 3 January 2026. The thieves swapped the funds to ETH and sent them through Tornado Cash; SlowMist's founder said the group was not one of the mainstream drainer crews. Holders of Aave aTokens and other permit-enabled tokens should check what they sign and revoke unknown spenders." }, { "slug": "bookmarklet-drains-solana-trading-terminals-wave", "title": "Ongoing wave: bookmarklet drainers target logged-in Solana memecoin trading apps", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/bookmarklet-drains-solana-trading-terminals-wave", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/bookmarklet-drains-solana-trading-terminals-wave.json", "status": "live", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "solana" ], "method": "bookmarklet", "product": "Users of web-based Solana memecoin trading apps (reported: Axiom, Fomo)", "tags": [ "solana", "bookmarklet", "campaign", "axiom", "fomo", "trading-terminal", "embedded-wallet", "session-hijack", "fake-verification", "drainer-tooling" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2025-12-26", "closedAt": null, "updatedAt": "2026-10-08T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Since at least late 2025, scammers have used fake tools and fake 'verification' steps to get Solana memecoin traders to drag a bookmark into their browser and click it on a trading site they are logged in to, where it takes the session or wallet data and the account is drained. Reports cover Axiom traders in December 2025 and a Fomo user who lost about $48,000 in October 2026; SlowMist called it an old method being reused. In September 2026 Socket found theft code in malicious extensions labelled as Axiom bookmarklet tooling and noted that Axiom bookmark drainers circulate publicly. Traders on any web terminal should refuse any bookmark from others, use MFA and keep trading wallets small." }, { "slug": "axiom-bookmark-method-drains-dec-2025", "title": "'Axiom Bookmark Method' drains trend on X, with claims of a trader losing over $200K", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/axiom-bookmark-method-drains-dec-2025", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/axiom-bookmark-method-drains-dec-2025.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "medium", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "unverified", "traction": "X trending topic on 26 Dec 2025 headlined 'Axiom Trade Bookmark Scam Drains Over $200,000 from Wallets' (seen as a search result; the page itself was not readable). Warning post by @insidecalls the same day showed about 43,000 views, 106 likes, 44 replies and 14 reposts when read on 22 Oct 2026. The original post with the $200K claim could not be found or opened.", "chains": [ "solana" ], "method": "bookmarklet", "product": "Axiom trading terminal users", "tags": [ "solana", "bookmarklet", "axiom", "trading-terminal", "session-hijack", "fake-token-checker", "memecoin", "social-report" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2025-12-26", "closedAt": "2025-12-26", "updatedAt": "2025-12-26T12:00:00Z", "summary": "In late December 2025, X users warned that scammers were luring Axiom traders with fake tools such as token checkers and getting them to drag a bookmark into the browser, which ran on the logged-in Axiom page and gave the scammer access to the victim's funds. An X trending summary headlined the scam as draining over $200,000, and one widely viewed warning post said a person the author knew had recently fallen for it and asked Axiom to patch it. No security firm, news outlet or Axiom statement confirming the amount was found. Axiom users should never run a bookmark someone gives them and should move funds if they did." }, { "slug": "trust-wallet-extension-v2-68-seed-theft-dec-2025", "title": "Trojanized Trust Wallet Chrome extension v2.68 steals seed phrases; $8.5M drained from 2,520 wallets", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/trust-wallet-extension-v2-68-seed-theft-dec-2025", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/trust-wallet-extension-v2-68-seed-theft-dec-2025.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "solana", "bitcoin", "ethereum" ], "method": "malicious-extension", "product": "Trust Wallet Chrome extension v2.68", "tags": [ "solana", "bitcoin", "ethereum", "malicious-extension", "trust-wallet", "browser-extension", "chrome-web-store", "seed-phrase", "leaked-api-key", "wallet", "supply-chain", "shai-hulud", "npm", "seed-phrase-theft" ], "amountUsd": 8500000, "victims": 2520, "startedAt": "2025-12-24", "closedAt": "2025-12-25", "updatedAt": "2025-12-31T12:00:00Z", "summary": "A malicious version 2.68 of the Trust Wallet browser extension was published to the Chrome Web Store on Dec 24, 2025 with a leaked store API key, skipping the normal release review. It harvested seed phrases through a modified analytics library and sent them to metrics-trustwallet[.]com. Early reports put losses near $7M; Trust Wallet's post-mortem says about $8.5M was drained from 2,520 wallet addresses across BTC, ETH and SOL, and traces the leak to the Shai-Hulud 2.0 npm worm. The fixed v2.69 shipped on Dec 25 and Trust Wallet says it will reimburse affected users; mobile app users were not affected." }, { "slug": "address-poisoning-50m-usdt-dec-2025", "title": "Trader loses nearly $50M in USDT to address poisoning after copying a lookalike address from history", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/address-poisoning-50m-usdt-dec-2025", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/address-poisoning-50m-usdt-dec-2025.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "ethereum" ], "method": "address-poisoning", "product": "Ethereum USDT holder (funds withdrawn from Binance)", "tags": [ "ethereum", "address-poisoning", "usdt", "test-transaction", "lookalike-address", "tornado-cash", "binance-withdrawal" ], "amountUsd": 49999950, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2025-12-20", "closedAt": "2025-12-20", "updatedAt": "2025-12-20T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 20 December 2025 a trader sent a 50 USDT test to the correct address, then 26 minutes later sent 49,999,950 USDT on Ethereum to a lookalike address the attacker had planted in their transaction history. The fake matched the first five and last four characters of the real address. Within 30 minutes the funds were swapped to DAI, then to about 16,690 ETH, and almost all of it went into Tornado Cash. Always check the full address, not just the start and end." }, { "slug": "permit-phishing-440k-usdc-dec-2025", "title": "Ethereum user loses $440K in USDC after signing a malicious permit", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/permit-phishing-440k-usdc-dec-2025", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/permit-phishing-440k-usdc-dec-2025.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "ethereum" ], "method": "permit-phishing", "product": "An Ethereum USDC holder", "tags": [ "ethereum", "permit-phishing", "permit", "erc-2612", "usdc", "scam-sniffer", "signature-phishing" ], "amountUsd": 440358, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2025-12-08", "closedAt": "2025-12-08", "updatedAt": "2025-12-09T12:00:00Z", "summary": "An Ethereum user lost $440,358 in USDC after signing a malicious ERC-20 permit signature, Scam Sniffer reported on 8 December 2025. A permit is an off-chain signature that lets another address spend your tokens, so no on-chain approval appears before the theft. Anyone who signs permit requests on unfamiliar sites is at risk; check the spender and amount before signing and revoke unknown permissions." }, { "slug": "solana-owner-permission-phishing-3m-dec-2025", "title": "Solana owner-permission phishing: OKX Wallet and Phantom add warnings after $3M loss", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/solana-owner-permission-phishing-3m-dec-2025", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/solana-owner-permission-phishing-3m-dec-2025.json", "status": "live", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "partly-contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "solana" ], "method": "token-owner-swap", "product": "Solana wallet user (single victim)", "tags": [ "solana", "token-owner-swap", "owner-permission", "assign", "setauthority", "simulation-blind-spot", "okx-wallet", "phantom", "slowmist", "signature-phishing", "account-takeover", "misttrack", "whale" ], "amountUsd": 3000000, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2025-12-05", "closedAt": null, "updatedAt": "2026-10-22T20:36:38.517Z", "summary": "A Solana wallet user signed a transaction from a disguised tool site that showed no balance change but moved the account's Owner permission to an attacker address starting GKJBEL. SlowMist reported over $3M lost, with about $2M in DeFi positions later recovered with protocol help. On 7 Jan 2026 OKX Wallet warned the technique was spreading across Solana, said it had added pre-signing warnings, and said Phantom had added similar alerts. Before signing, check for any instruction that changes an account owner or authority; normal wallets never ask you to change your own account's owner." }, { "slug": "upbit-solana-hot-wallet-hack-nov-2025", "title": "Upbit loses about $36M as Solana hot wallet is drained; Lazarus suspected", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/upbit-solana-hot-wallet-hack-nov-2025", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/upbit-solana-hot-wallet-hack-nov-2025.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "solana" ], "method": null, "product": "Upbit exchange Solana hot wallet", "tags": [ "solana", "exchange", "cex", "hot-wallet", "upbit", "lazarus", "north-korea" ], "amountUsd": 36000000, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2025-11-27", "closedAt": "2025-11-27", "updatedAt": "2025-11-28T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On Nov 27, 2025, South Korea's largest exchange Upbit disclosed irregular withdrawals that drained roughly $36 million in Solana-network tokens from a hot wallet. Upbit froze the affected wallets, moved remaining funds to cold storage, said cold wallets were not breached and pledged to reimburse customers in full. South Korean authorities suspect North Korea's Lazarus Group, according to Yonhap, and CertiK said it tracked over 100 exploiter addresses on Solana. How the attackers got signing access has not been explained publicly. Customers did not need to act, but should treat any 'Upbit refund' message as phishing." }, { "slug": "aerodrome-velodrome-dns-hijack-nov-2025", "title": "Aerodrome and Velodrome front-ends hijacked via DNS, cloned sites serve Eleven Drainer", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/aerodrome-velodrome-dns-hijack-nov-2025", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/aerodrome-velodrome-dns-hijack-nov-2025.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "base", "optimism" ], "method": "front-end-hijack", "product": "Aerodrome (Base) and Velodrome (Optimism) web app users", "tags": [ "base", "optimism", "front-end-hijack", "aerodrome", "velodrome", "dns-hijack", "eleven-drainer", "drainer-as-a-service", "approval-phishing", "dex" ], "amountUsd": 700000, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2025-11-21", "closedAt": "2025-12-02", "updatedAt": "2025-12-02T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 21 November 2025 an attacker changed the DNS records for aerodrome.finance and velodrome.finance, sending visitors to a cloned front-end running 'Eleven Drainer' code. Users who signed on the fake site lost tokens: Blockaid tied about $700K to nine attacker addresses, and Halborn put losses above $1M. The smart contracts were not touched. Anyone who signed on either site that evening should revoke approvals they don't recognise." }, { "slug": "dmt-airdrop-dexmaxai-phishing-nov-2025", "title": "DMT token airdrop promoted by @dexmaxai tied to $130K phishing loss on Solana", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/dmt-airdrop-dexmaxai-phishing-nov-2025", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/dmt-airdrop-dexmaxai-phishing-nov-2025.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "solana" ], "method": "fake-airdrop-site", "product": "DMT airdrop claimants (@dexmaxai)", "tags": [ "solana", "fake-airdrop-site", "airdrop", "dmt", "dexmaxai", "x-account", "claim-phishing" ], "amountUsd": 130000, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2025-11-20", "closedAt": "2025-11-20", "updatedAt": "2025-11-20T12:00:00Z", "summary": "SlowMist's hack database lists a $130,000 phishing loss on Nov 20, 2025, filed under Solana, tied to the DMT token airdrop promoted by the X account @dexmaxai. The airdrop claim was the lure for the phishing. If you claimed DMT, check your wallet for token delegations or unexpected outgoing transfers and move what is left to a new wallet." }, { "slug": "solana-address-poisoning-wave-2025-2026", "title": "Address poisoning hit nearly 4.5M Solana wallets; 1,104 sent $940K to lookalike addresses", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/solana-address-poisoning-wave-2025-2026", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/solana-address-poisoning-wave-2025-2026.json", "status": "live", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "solana" ], "method": "address-poisoning", "product": "Solana wallet users sending to exchange deposit addresses", "tags": [ "solana", "address-poisoning", "dusting", "usdt", "usdc", "phantom", "exchange-deposit", "bitquery" ], "amountUsd": 940106, "victims": 1104, "startedAt": "2025-11-17", "closedAt": null, "updatedAt": "2026-10-12T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Bitquery data reported by CryptoSlate shows scammers sent tiny 'dust' transfers from lookalike addresses to 4,497,798 Solana wallets between Oct 30, 2025 and Oct 7, 2026, betting that victims would later copy the fake address from their history. In a studied subset of poisoned wallets, 1,104 wallets paid a combined $940,106 to lookalikes, a figure the researchers call a floor. Receiving dust cannot drain a wallet; the loss happens only when you send to the wrong address. Copy addresses from your exchange's deposit page or a saved contact, never from transaction history." }, { "slug": "whale-safe-1of1-key-compromise-nov-2025", "title": "Whale's 1-of-1 Safe multisig drained of $27M+ after key compromise, ETH laundered via Tornado Cash", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/whale-safe-1of1-key-compromise-nov-2025", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/whale-safe-1of1-key-compromise-nov-2025.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "chains": [ "ethereum" ], "method": "key-leak", "product": "Private whale's Gnosis Safe multisig (Ethereum)", "tags": [ "ethereum", "key-leak", "gnosis-safe", "multisig", "private-key-compromise", "aave", "tornado-cash", "whale" ], "amountUsd": 27300000, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2025-11-04", "closedAt": "2026-01-06", "updatedAt": "2026-01-06T12:00:00Z", "summary": "A private whale's Gnosis Safe on Ethereum, set up so a single signature could approve transactions, was taken over and drained of about $27.3M according to PeckShield; Hacken's forensics say losses may exceed $40M. Ownership passed to the attacker six minutes after the Safe was created on 4 November 2025, and the thief laundered ETH through Tornado Cash in batches while slowly unwinding a leveraged Aave position. A multisig with one signer is only as safe as that one key." }, { "slug": "bluenoroff-ghostcall-ghosthire-genai-malware-oct-2025", "title": "Kaspersky: North Korea's BlueNoroff uses generative AI to speed up malware in GhostCall and GhostHire crypto attacks", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/bluenoroff-ghostcall-ghosthire-genai-malware-oct-2025", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/bluenoroff-ghostcall-ghosthire-genai-malware-oct-2025.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "medium", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "ai-malware", "note": "Kaspersky says generative AI has let BlueNoroff speed up malware development and refine its attack techniques; it describes the fake calls as replaying videos of earlier victims, not deepfakes." }, "chains": [ "multi-evm" ], "method": "social-engineering", "product": "Web3 and crypto executives, founders and blockchain developers", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "social-engineering", "dprk", "bluenoroff", "lazarus", "ghostcall", "ghosthire", "snatchcrypto", "fake-meeting", "fake-job-interview", "telegram", "github", "macos", "kaspersky", "ai" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2025-10-28", "closedAt": "2025-10-28", "updatedAt": "2025-10-28T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Kaspersky disclosed on 28 October 2025 two BlueNoroff campaigns aimed at Web3 and crypto organisations in India, Turkey, Australia and other countries in Europe and Asia, active since at least April 2025. GhostCall reaches executives and founders on Telegram with fake investor meetings, where an 'audio fix' installs malware; GhostHire sends blockchain developers fake job tests in GitHub repositories that hide malware. Kaspersky says generative AI has helped the group develop malware faster, and the payloads include crypto stealers. No loss figures were given." }, { "slug": "thorchain-founder-deepfake-zoom-wallet-drain-sep-2025", "title": "THORChain co-founder loses about $1.35M after a fake Zoom call showing a deepfake of a friend", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/thorchain-founder-deepfake-zoom-wallet-drain-sep-2025", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/thorchain-founder-deepfake-zoom-wallet-drain-sep-2025.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "ai-lure", "note": "The founder said he saw a deepfake of his friend on the fake Zoom call that came from the friend's hacked Telegram account." }, "chains": [ "ethereum" ], "method": "social-engineering", "product": "THORChain co-founder's personal wallet", "tags": [ "ethereum", "social-engineering", "dprk", "deepfake", "zoom", "fake-meeting", "telegram", "account-takeover", "metamask", "zachxbt", "thorchain", "thorswap", "ai" ], "amountUsd": 1350000, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2025-09-04", "closedAt": "2025-09-12", "updatedAt": "2025-09-12T12:00:00Z", "summary": "In early September 2025 THORChain co-founder John-Paul Thorbjornsen got a Zoom link from a friend's hacked Telegram account, joined in his browser and, by his account, saw a deepfake of his friend with no sound before leaving. An old MetaMask wallet of his was later drained of about $1.35M in Kyber Network and THORSwap tokens (PeckShield valued it at about $1.2M); he believes the key was reached through iCloud Keychain or a zero-day. ZachXBT attributed the theft to North Korean hackers, and THORChain said the protocol itself was not affected." }, { "slug": "nx-s1ngularity-npm-malware-ai-cli-wallet-search-aug-2025", "title": "Compromised Nx npm packages ran victims' AI command-line tools to hunt for wallet and keystore files", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/nx-s1ngularity-npm-malware-ai-cli-wallet-search-aug-2025", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/nx-s1ngularity-npm-malware-ai-cli-wallet-search-aug-2025.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "critical", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "ai-malware", "note": "The malware ran locally installed AI CLIs (Claude, Gemini, Amazon Q) to inventory wallet, keystore and secret files for theft; Wiz found the AI step worked in under a quarter of cases and saw no successful crypto exfiltration." }, "chains": [ "multi-evm" ], "method": "supply-chain", "product": "Nx build system on npm", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "supply-chain", "nx", "npm", "s1ngularity", "ai-cli", "claude-code", "gemini-cli", "amazon-q", "keystore", "github-tokens", "github-actions", "infostealer", "wiz", "ai" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": 1700, "startedAt": "2025-08-26", "closedAt": "2025-09-06", "updatedAt": "2025-09-06T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Around 26 August 2025 malicious versions of Nx, a widely used JavaScript build tool, were published to npm and stole GitHub and npm tokens on install. The malware also looked for installed AI command-line tools (Claude, Gemini and Amazon Q) and ran them to search the disk for crypto wallet and keystore files, .env files and SSH keys, then published the results to repos in the victim's own GitHub account. Wiz counted over 1,700 users with leaked secrets and over 6,700 private repos made public, but saw no successful crypto theft, partly because the AI tools often refused. Anyone who installed the bad versions should rotate tokens and move funds from wallet files on that machine." }, { "slug": "cursor-contractshark-solidity-extension-dev-key-theft-aug-2025", "title": "Malicious 'contractshark.solidity-lang' Cursor extension steals an Ethereum core developer's private key", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/cursor-contractshark-solidity-extension-dev-key-theft-aug-2025", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/cursor-contractshark-solidity-extension-dev-key-theft-aug-2025.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "medium", "threatStatus": "partly-contained", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "agent-target", "note": "The key-stealing extension was installed in Cursor, the AI code editor the developer used as a coding assistant; it read the .env file rather than abusing the AI itself." }, "chains": [ "ethereum" ], "method": "supply-chain", "product": "Cursor AI code editor users", "tags": [ "ethereum", "supply-chain", "cursor", "ai-code-editor", "malicious-extension", "solidity", "env-file", "private-key", "developers", "ai" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2025-08-13", "closedAt": "2025-08-13", "updatedAt": "2025-08-13T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Cointelegraph reported on 13 August 2025 that an Ethereum core developer's hot wallet was drained after he installed 'contractshark.solidity-lang', a fake Solidity extension for the Cursor AI code editor with over 54,000 downloads. The extension read his .env file and sent the private key to the attacker, who waited three days before emptying the wallet. The loss was a few hundred dollars because he kept only test funds there and his main holdings on hardware wallets. Keep keys out of .env files on development machines and use small, separate test wallets." }, { "slug": "ai-video-mev-bot-tutorials-drainer-contracts-aug-2025", "title": "YouTube 'MEV bot' tutorials, some AI-generated, tricked users into deploying drainer contracts; $900K+ taken", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/ai-video-mev-bot-tutorials-drainer-contracts-aug-2025", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/ai-video-mev-bot-tutorials-drainer-contracts-aug-2025.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "ai-lure", "note": "SentinelLABS says several tutorial videos appear to be AI-generated from audio and visual tells, though the most successful one (about $902,000 taken) does not appear to be." }, "chains": [ "ethereum" ], "method": "social-engineering", "product": "Ethereum users following YouTube 'MEV bot' tutorials", "tags": [ "ethereum", "social-engineering", "mev-bot", "fake-trading-bot", "youtube", "remix", "smart-contract-scam", "ai-generated-video", "sentinelone", "ai" ], "amountUsd": 900000, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2025-08-05", "closedAt": "2025-08-05", "updatedAt": "2025-08-05T12:00:00Z", "summary": "SentinelLABS reported in August 2025 that scammers use YouTube tutorials to get people to deploy a 'free' Ethereum arbitrage bot contract through Remix, fund it with ETH and press Start. Hidden code sends the ETH to an attacker wallet, and the top attacker address alone received 244.9 ETH (about $902,000). The videos ran on aged channels with manipulated comments, and SentinelLABS says several appear to be AI-generated. Versions of the scam have run since at least early 2024 and were described as ongoing." }, { "slug": "kodane-patch-manager-ai-generated-solana-drainer-npm-jul-2025", "title": "AI-written npm package @kodane/patch-manager drained Solana wallets after 1,500+ downloads", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/kodane-patch-manager-ai-generated-solana-drainer-npm-jul-2025", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/kodane-patch-manager-ai-generated-solana-drainer-npm-jul-2025.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "ai-malware", "note": "Safety's researchers say the code appears largely AI-generated, citing emojis, heavy comments and logging they link to Anthropic's Claude; this is an inference from code style." }, "chains": [ "solana" ], "method": "supply-chain", "product": "npm package @kodane/patch-manager", "tags": [ "solana", "supply-chain", "npm", "kodane", "ai-generated-code", "claude", "wallet-drainer", "postinstall", "safety", "railway", "ai" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2025-07-28", "closedAt": "2025-07-30", "updatedAt": "2025-08-01T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 28 July 2025 an npm package called @kodane/patch-manager, posing as a license-validation and registry cache tool for Node.js, was published with a hidden wallet drainer in its install script. Once installed it looked for crypto wallets on Windows, macOS and Linux and sent the funds to a Solana address, leaving just enough for fees. It was downloaded more than 1,500 times before npm flagged it on 30 July; Safety, which found it, said the code appears to be largely AI-generated. No total loss was published." }, { "slug": "cursor-fake-solidity-extension-500k-crypto-theft-jul-2025", "title": "Fake Solidity extension for the Cursor AI code editor leads to about $500K crypto theft from a developer", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/cursor-fake-solidity-extension-500k-crypto-theft-jul-2025", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/cursor-fake-solidity-extension-500k-crypto-theft-jul-2025.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "partly-contained", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "agent-target", "note": "The malicious extension reached the victim through the extension marketplace used by Cursor, an AI-powered code editor; the AI features themselves were not exploited." }, "chains": [ "multi-evm" ], "method": "supply-chain", "product": "Cursor AI code editor users (Open VSX extensions)", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "supply-chain", "cursor", "ai-code-editor", "open-vsx", "malicious-extension", "solidity", "screenconnect", "quasar", "infostealer", "developers", "ai" ], "amountUsd": 500000, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2025-07-10", "closedAt": "2025-07-10", "updatedAt": "2025-07-10T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Kaspersky reported on 10 July 2025 that a blockchain developer lost about $500,000 in crypto after installing a fake Solidity extension in Cursor, an AI code editor built on VS Code that gets extensions from the Open VSX registry. The extension gave no Solidity support; it installed ScreenConnect remote-access software, then the Quasar backdoor and a stealer that took browser, email and wallet data, including seed phrases. The attackers used the seed phrases to drain the developer's wallets. Developers should vet editor extensions and never keep seed phrases or funded keys on a coding machine." }, { "slug": "lovable-ai-built-aave-phishing-sites-jun-2025", "title": "Phishing campaign used the AI site builder Lovable to fake Aave and push wallet connections", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/lovable-ai-built-aave-phishing-sites-jun-2025", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/lovable-ai-built-aave-phishing-sites-jun-2025.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "medium", "threatStatus": "partly-contained", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "ai-lure", "note": "Proofpoint says criminals are increasingly using the AI website builder Lovable to create and host phishing sites, and the Aave lure was a Lovable-built app." }, "chains": [ "multi-evm" ], "method": "fake-airdrop-site", "product": "Aave and other DeFi users receiving fake reward emails", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "fake-airdrop-site", "aave", "lovable", "ai-website-builder", "email-phishing", "sendgrid", "wallet-connect", "proofpoint", "drainer", "ai" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2025-06-17", "closedAt": "2025-08-20", "updatedAt": "2025-08-20T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Proofpoint reported on 20 August 2025 that criminals were using Lovable, an AI website builder that makes sites from text prompts, to create and host phishing and wallet-drainer pages. In June 2025 nearly 10,000 emails sent through SendGrid led to a Lovable-built app that redirected to a fake Aave site asking people to connect a crypto wallet; Proofpoint said the likely aim was to steal assets from any connected wallet. Lovable removed a phishing cluster and added real-time checks after the report. No loss figures were published." }, { "slug": "bluenoroff-deepfake-zoom-crypto-foundation-jun-2025", "title": "North Korea's BlueNoroff used deepfaked executives on a Zoom call to infect a crypto foundation employee's Mac", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/bluenoroff-deepfake-zoom-crypto-foundation-jun-2025", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/bluenoroff-deepfake-zoom-crypto-foundation-jun-2025.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "medium", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "ai-lure", "note": "Huntress says the Zoom meeting contained several deepfakes of known senior leaders of the victim's company, used to make the call look genuine before the fake 'extension' install." }, "chains": [ "multi-evm" ], "method": "social-engineering", "product": "Crypto foundation staff on macOS", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "social-engineering", "dprk", "bluenoroff", "ta444", "lazarus", "deepfake", "zoom", "fake-meeting", "telegram", "calendly", "macos", "cryptobot", "infostealer", "huntress", "ai" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2025-06-11", "closedAt": "2025-06-18", "updatedAt": "2025-06-18T12:00:00Z", "summary": "Huntress reported on 18 June 2025 that an employee of a cryptocurrency foundation was contacted on Telegram, sent a Calendly invite and led to a fake Zoom domain. Weeks later the employee joined a group call that contained several deepfakes of the company's senior leadership; when 'audio problems' came up, they were told to install a Zoom extension that was really a malicious AppleScript. It installed a set of macOS backdoors, a keylogger and screen recorder, and a crypto-wallet stealer called CryptoBot. Huntress did not say whether funds were stolen." }, { "slug": "polygon-cofounder-deepfake-zoom-calls-may-2025", "title": "Deepfake Zoom calls of Polygon's co-founder push malware to startup founders from a hijacked Telegram account", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/polygon-cofounder-deepfake-zoom-calls-may-2025", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/polygon-cofounder-deepfake-zoom-calls-may-2025.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "medium", "threatStatus": "active", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "ai-lure", "note": "Nailwal said the calls showed AI-generated videos of him, the Polygon Ventures lead and a supposed team member, used to get targets to install malware." }, "chains": [ "multi-evm" ], "method": "social-engineering", "product": "Startup founders in Polygon's investment network", "tags": [ "multi-evm", "social-engineering", "deepfake", "zoom", "fake-meeting", "telegram", "account-takeover", "polygon", "malware", "founders", "ai" ], "amountUsd": null, "victims": null, "startedAt": "2025-05-13", "closedAt": "2025-05-14", "updatedAt": "2025-05-14T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 13 May 2025 Polygon co-founder Sandeep Nailwal warned that attackers had taken over the Telegram account of the head of Polygon Ventures and were messaging startup founders in its network. Targets were invited to Zoom calls showing AI-generated video of Nailwal and other team members with no audio, and were urged to install an 'SDK' to fix the sound, which would infect their computers. No losses were reported. Do not install software during a call, even when the people on screen look like contacts you know." }, { "slug": "aixbt-ai-agent-dashboard-breach-55-eth-mar-2025", "title": "Attacker breaches AIXBT AI agent's dashboard and queues prompts that send 55.5 ETH from its wallet", "url": "https://drains.watch/i/aixbt-ai-agent-dashboard-breach-55-eth-mar-2025", "json": "https://drains.watch/i/aixbt-ai-agent-dashboard-breach-55-eth-mar-2025.json", "status": "closed", "severity": "high", "threatStatus": "contained", "verification": "verified", "ai": { "role": "agent-target", "note": "An attacker with access to the AIXBT agent's dashboard queued two prompts that instructed the AI agent to send 55.5 ETH from its wallet; the maintainer said the AI model itself was not manipulated." }, "chains": [ "base" ], "method": "agent-hijack", "product": "AIXBT AI agent wallet", "tags": [ "base", "agent-hijack", "aixbt", "ai-agent", "agent-dashboard", "dashboard-compromise", "simulacrum", "eth", "ai" ], "amountUsd": 106200, "victims": 1, "startedAt": "2025-03-18", "closedAt": "2025-03-19", "updatedAt": "2025-03-19T12:00:00Z", "summary": "On 18 March 2025 an attacker got into the dashboard of AIXBT, an autonomous AI crypto agent, and queued two prompts that made it transfer about 55.5 ETH (about $106,200) out of its wallet on Base. The maintainer said core systems were not affected and the AI itself was not manipulated; the weak point was access to the agent's control dashboard. Keys were swapped, dashboard access was paused and the attacker's addresses were reported to exchanges. Anyone running an AI agent with a wallet should lock down its control panel and cap what it can send." } ] }